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PROLOGUE 
Recently, I overheard my father suddenly ask my eight year old 
son, Alan, whether he wanted to see his grandpa's war medals. I was 
surprised to hear him ask Alan this question since I never 
remembered him asking me when I was a child whether I had wanted 
to see them. 
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My father had always seemed reluctant to talk about his war 
experiences. He was never anxious to go to his 442nd army unit 
reunions, remarking that he didn't "like all the patriotic crap that 
went along with them." He kept in sporadic touch with only one army 
buddy-the sole survivor, besides my father, of an ill-fated patrol in 
the forests of Italy. They exchanged Christmas cards for 50 years, and 
visited each other only occasionally. In fact, my sister and I never met 
him. But when his friend died only a few months ago, he and my 
mother immediately made travel plans to grieve with his \vidow. 
Shortly after that was when my father took Alan into his bed-
room and brought out the box of medals containing his Purple Heart 
and Bronze Star and all the other colorful bars and clusters he had 
won. Alan pinned some on, asked about others, and played with them 
in the same way he often played with shells, coins, or figurines by 
lining them up, comparing them, ranking them in order of which he 
liked best. When he asked about the significance of one or the other, 
my father would try earnestly to give explanations. I'm not sure 
whether Alan understood them completely. 
As I listened to the interchange, I tried to remember whether my 
father ever shared his wartime experiences with me as he did that 
afternoon with Alan. I drew a blank. I did remember, however, that 
when I reached draft age in the sixties my father and mother 
encouraged me to protest the Vietnam War. I recalled that when I 
had just entered high school my father took me and my sister to Wash-
ington, D.C., in 1963 to be in the Big March. I thought back to the 
cold early dawns when he and the entire family would board the 
morning buses to Washington to participate in the national anti-war 
rallies. 
I remembered how he had packed me off to Brooklyn-
Oceanhill Brownsville and Bedford Stuyvesant-to work with the 
African-American communities there during the struggle over com-
munity control of schools. He was one of the first to volunteer to 
work with the fledgling Asian Community Center twenty-five years 
ago. 
As I reflected, it dawned upon me that he had shown me his med-
als all along. I had been taught what he had learned from his wartime 
experiences, in the same way that my mother had taught me about 
what she had learned from her camp experiences by her lifetime of 
organizing against anti-Asian violence, for workers' and immigrants' 
rights, and the empowerment of women, people of color, and the 
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poor. They both understood that the responsibility of being 
oppressed is first to survive and then to resist. They both realized that 
in each battle fought against subordination, one earned a citation in 
the larger struggle for dignity and equality. These are the medals I 
was shown as a child. These are the mementoes I keep pinned close 
to my heart. These are the medals I hope to pass on to Alan and his 
younger brother, Christopher. 
Alan finally took one of my father's old medals and placed it in 
his treasure collection of cards, figurines, old pennies, and found 
objects. My father put the remainders back into the box, and returned 
it to the bottom of his bedroom bureau drawer. Nothing more has 
been spoken of it since that afternoon. 
The rest is up to me. 
INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago when they had reached their seventies, my par-
ents, like other Nisei, received $20,000 from the United States in pay-
ment for their incarceration during World War II.1 Needless to say, I 
have no personal problem with the concept of their receiving individ-
ual monetary reparations. Indeed, the amount given to them was very 
little recompense for the fear, time, humiliation, and material loss that 
relocation wreaked upon them, their families, and community.2 It was 
little solace for the Purple Heart my father received in Italy, or for the 
friends he lost in the battlefields and dirt roads of Europe fighting for 
a nation that had locked away their families. The money was both 
1. On August 10, 1988, President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989 app. (1988)). 
2. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which, in 
effect, excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from residing on the West Coast of the United 
States. The vast majority of those interned were Issei and Nisei. My parents are "Nisei"-
American born Japanese-Americans. My grandparents are "Issei," the immigrant generation. 
My generation is the third, "Sansei." There were also "Kibei," who were American born but 
were sent overseas for education. 
Although I am aware of the implications and power of terminology, I purposefully use cer-
tain terms loosely and interchangeably. For example, I refer to the camps as "internment 
camps," "relocation camps," "relocation centers," or "concentration camps." I refer to the 
extraordinary movement to redress the camp experience as "redress,"and sometimes I refer to 
the money damages as "reparations" even though I know that some might consider the term 
"reparations" as implying that money damages paid to American citizens for constitutional vio-
lations are equivalent to money paid to non-Americans as wartime reparations. I use the words 
interchangeably simply because to me they Signify the same things-camp = prison and redress! 
reparations = justice. 
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deserved and small compensation for an outrage motivated by racial 
hysteria and fueled by a history of racial paranoia. 
The source of my discomfort is more long range. As one African-
American scholar described her ambivalent reaction to the news of 
Japanese-American reparations: 
The apology was so appropriate and the payment so justified, 
however insufficient it was, that the source of my ambivalent reac-
tion was at first difficult to identify. After some introspection, I 
guiltily discovered that my sentiments were related to a very dark, 
brooding feeling that I had fought long and hard to conquer-infer-
iority. A feeling that took first root in the soil of "Why them and 
not me?" .... 3 
Indeed, there has been a long history of attempts by African-
Americans to attain redress not only for slavery, but also for its 
effects.4 However, there has been little Congressional support. On 
November 20, 1989, Congressman John Conyers introduced H.R. 3745 
calling for a commission to examine the institution of slavery and de 
jure and de facto discrimination against African-Americans.5 While it 
3. Vmcene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Ameri-
cans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597, 647 (1993). 
4. See id. at 600·607. Professor Verdun chronicles the various attempts at reparations for 
African-Americans from the end of the Civil War, to the Black Manifesto in the 1960s demand-
ing $500 million dollars from churches and synagogues, to the claims for land and reparations by 
those such as the Nation of Islam and Queen Mother Moore, to the National Coalition of Blacks 
for Reparations as well as bills relating to reparations introduced in Congress and in state legisla-
tures. See id. See also Rhonda V. Magee, The Master'S Tools from the Bottom Up: Responses to 
African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. 
L. REv. 863, 876-92 (1993) (reviewing the history of the attempts for reparations for African-
Americans); BORIS BITTIKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (reviewing the 
potential legal theories for and obstacles to reparations for African-Americans). 
In 1995, the Florida state legislature awarded $150,000 to each of nine survivors, as well as 
other monetary awards to 143 descendants, of a black community in Rosewood, Florida, burned 
down by a rioting white mob in 1923. See Lori S. Robinson, Righting a Wrong Among Black 
Americans, the Debate Is Escalating over Whether an Apology for Slavery Is Enough, SEATILE 
POST-lNTELLIGENCER, June 29,1997, at El. 
5. H.R. 3745 reads in relevant part: 
A bill to acknowledge the fundamental injustice; cruelty, brutality and inhumanity of 
slavery in the United States and the Thirteen American Colonies between 1619 and 
1685 and to establish a commission to examine the institution of slavery, subsequent de 
jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against African-Americans, and 
the impact of these forces on living African Americans, to make recommendations to 
the Congress on appropriate remedies, and for other purposes .... 
H.R. 3745, 101st Congress (1989). 
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continues to languish in congressional committee purgatory, Conyers 
has unsuccessfully renewed his bill in every Congress since 1989.6 
Even the simple notion of a national apology for slavery has 
raised much controversy. On June 12, 1997, Congressman Tony Hall 
introduced a House Resolution calling for an apology to those who 
suffered as slaves under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States'? The response was quick, and overwhelmingly negative. A 
national poll found that 61 % of the people polled disfavored a Con-
gressional apology for slavery, even as blacks favored the apology by a 
2-1 margin.8 Even Congressman Hall, the sponsor of the resolution 
was "stunned" at the amount and level of criticism of his proposaJ.9 
Perhaps what was most striking about the reaction to the apology pro-
posal was the immediate dismissal by Congress and the President of 
any consideration of black reparations.10 Even during the debate 
6. In 1991, Conyers enlisted 19 other Representatives as co-sponsors of the bill, H.R. 
1684. 137 CONGo REc. H2134-0l (1991). See Scott Shepard, Slavery Apology Plan Raises Repa-
ratiollS Issue, ATLANTA CoNST., June 17, 1997, at A6 (stating that Conyers has reintroduced his 
commission legislation in every session of Congress since 1989); Lori S. Robinson, supra note 4; 
Jill Zuckerman & Brian McGrory, Talk of Apologizing for Slavery Sparks Debate on Efficacy, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 1997, at AI. 
7. H.R.Res. 96, 105th Congress (1997). 
8. See Paul Leavitt & Robert Silvers, Poll: Congress Shouldn't Make Apology for Slavery, 
USA TODAY, July 2,1997, at AS (citing a USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll). The math indicates 
that if blacks polled were approximately 66% in favor, then the percentage of whites disfavoring 
an apology must have been significantly higher than 61 %. 
9. See Michael A. Fletcher, For AmericallS, Nothing Is Simple About Making Apology for 
Slavery; Congressman's Suggestion Draws Fire from All Sides, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 5, 1997, 
at AI. The article reports that Hall concedes his idea is "virtually dead" and that he has received 
hundreds of letters and phone messages "mostly condemning his idea, often \vith harsh racial 
language." Indeed, the negative messages have ranged from sentiments such as apologies were 
in order for those who were stripped of their slaves to thanks should be given to the slave traders 
who "rescued" slaves from Africa. Hall is quoted as stating that "[t]he reaction has stunned 
me .... " The conservative Congressional reaction was predictably negative with Speaker of the 
House Gingrich dismissing the measure as "emotional symbolism." Scott Shepard, Slavery 
Apology Plan Raises ReparatiollS Issue, ATLANTA CONST., June 12, 1997, at A6. 
10. See Shepard, supra note 9 ("Congressional leaders are cool to the notion that the fed-
eral government should formally apologize for slavery, perhaps because such an apology would 
open the door to discussion of monetary reparations for descendants of slaves."). President 
Clinton rejected the idea of a national apology for slavery with press speculation that his rejec-
tion was fueled by his concern about the reparations issue. See Clinton: No Apology for Slavery, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 6, 1997, at A4 (reporting that aides privately stated that the White 
House was concerned about reparations). See also Zuckerman & McGrory, supra note 7 
(reporting that Clinton "did not think the federal government should pay reparations to the 
descendants of slaves"). 
Significantly, the congressional supporters of redress assured the Congress that the redress 
bill would "not open the door for claims by descendants of former slaves or the descendants of 
Native American victims of the Federal Government's 19th century policies \vith respect to 
American Indians," since payments were not to be made to heirs or descendants of internees 
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about Japanese-American redress, opponents of the redress bill 
warned of the possibility that its passage would set a precedent for 
reparations to other groupsY It is no wonder that other people of 
color, particularly African-Americans, who support reparations to 
Japanese-Americans also simultaneously feel vaguely unsettled about 
it. 
Moreover, the sentiment that there is something disquieting 
about Congress granting redress to Japanese-Americans, but refusing 
even to consider the issue with respect to another deserving group, 
has not been lost on Asian American legal scholars. In his incisive 
article, Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress 
and Reparations, Professor Eric Yamamoto articulated the dangers of 
Japanese-American reparations in a larger context.12 In a fundamen-
tal sense, since reparations do not change the "fundamental realities 
of power," he wrote, it may become a means by which "illusions of 
change" are fostered thereby perpetuating the political structures that 
gave rise to the original injuriesP Indeed, he surmised that the sup-
port of reparations by a Reagan-Bush Administration could have 
been explained by its desire to bolster its image among moderate vot-
ers. It helped strengthen the appearance internationally that the 
United States was a country committed to human rights. Finally, it 
allowed the Republican Administration to point to a "model minor-
ity" group to defend its conservative racial policies.14 Indeed, Yama-
moto speculated that a pending class action lawsuit concerning the 
under the redress bill. See 134 CONGo REc. S4271 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Matsunaga). 
11. Senator Wallop of Wyoming offered an amendment that no funds would be appropri-
ated for Japanese-Americans until the Cherokee Nation was compensated for the Trail of Tears, 
134 Cong. Rec. S4393 (April 20, 1988); Senator Helms of North Carolina offered an amendment 
to bar any territorial claims of Mexico, Native Americans or any other nation as compensation 
for any claim, id. at S4394. Given the probability that any reparations bill for Native Ameri-
cans-America's first internees-would neither be forthcoming nor successful, this opposition to 
Japanese-American redress on the basis of a preeminent Native American redress strikes a cyni-
cal chord. In fact, in a touch of even greater cynicism, Senator Jesse Helms, a longtime opponent 
of civil rights legislation, voiced his opposition to Japanese-American redress in part because of 
the possibility of its rationale being extended to African-American victims of Jim Crow educa-
tion policies. ld. at S4411. See also remarks of Senator Chafee about the possible precedent in 
terms of reparations to Native Americans and Blacks, id. at S4335; statement of Congressman 
Davis that it is unfair to first compensate Japanese-Americans when there were many other 
injustices done to other groups that should be compensated first, 134 Congo Rec. H6314 (Aug. 8, 
1988). 
12. Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and 
Reparations, 20 DENY. J. lNr'L L. & POL'y 223 (1992). 
13. ld. at 231-32, 240-41. 
14. ld. at 213. 
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internment, Hohri v. United States, is threateried the possibility of a 
15. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part rev'd in part, 782 
F.2d 227 (1986), vacated 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779 (1988), cert. denied,488 
U.S. 925 (1988). 
Hohri ultimately turned on the issue of whether the six year statute of limitations had run 
on the plaintiffs' constitutional takings claim. 847 F.2d at 779. In Korematsu v. United States and 
Hirabayashi v. United States, both challenges to the internment, the Supreme Court had held 
that the internment was constitutional based upon the government's allegations of military 
necessity. 782 F.2d at 232-33. For a review of Korematsu and Hirabayshi cases, see infra note 31. 
The Hohri plaintiffs, representing a class of former internees, argued that the government 
had purposely and fraudulently concealed evidence frem the Supreme Court during the Kore-
matsu and Hirabayshi cases that indicated there was no military necessity for the internment, 
and that the six year statute had therefore been tolled. ld. The district court, while not contra-
dicting the assertion that the government had fraudulently concealed information from the 
Supreme Court, nevertheless concluded that the concealed information had been available to 
the plaintiffs as early as the "late 1940s" and held the takings claim barred by the statute of 
limitations. 586 F. Supp. at 790. That holding was adopted without co=ent by the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 847 F.2d at 779. 
What is striking about the district court's opinion (and the Federal Circuit's brief affirmance 
of it) was its lack of contextural basis. Since the finding of military necessity by the Supreme 
Court and its presumption of military deference was the basis of the original Korematsu and 
Hirabayahi decisions, "nothing less than an authoritative statement by one of the political 
branches, purporting to review the evidence when taken as a whole, could rebut the presumption 
[of military deference] articulated in Korematsu." 782 F.2d at 251. In this case, the "authorita-
tive statement" was the REpORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND lNrERN-
MENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JuSTICE DENIED (1982), the report of the Congressional 
Commission set up in 1980 to investigate the internment which concluded that information had 
been withheld from the Supreme Court. ld. at 252. 
Indeed, even the district court upon dismissing the case, was forced to acknowledge that a 
challenge to a finding by the Supreme Court was a "formidable obstacle," but noted that such a 
task had been accomplished previously by "diligent advocates." 586 F. Supp. at 788. However, 
what was left undiscussed by either the district court or the Federal Circuit was the effect of the 
political and social climate in the "late 1940s" or even in the early 1950s in terms of the reality of 
expecting the Supreme Court to be receptive toward Japanese-Americans challenging Court 
findings made only a few years before. The political climate ,vith respect to the Japanese-Ameri-
cans being seen as foreigners had probably changed little, given that Asian Americans are still 
seen as foreigners even today. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: 
Racializing Asian Americans in a Society Obsessed with 0.1.,6 HAST. WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 174-86 
(1995) (describing the stereotypes of Asians Americans as foreigners and outsiders). 
Moreover, given what information was available in the 1940s-several internal government 
documents dismissing any Japanese-American security threat-it seemed eminently reasonable 
to expect that the Japanese-American co=unity would assume that a challenge to the military 
deference rationale would be unsuccessful. 847 F.2d at 783 (Baldwin, dissenting) ("According to 
the trial court, the only obstacle in their way was a pair of Supreme Court decisions upholding 
[the government's] actions and granting complete deference to the military's judgment .... At 
that time, however, ,vith information available, they were destined for dismissal on the plead-
ings.") Indeed, two of the major cases cited by the district court of successful challenges to 
Supreme Court findings (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) challenging Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) challeng-
ing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842» had intervals of decades between them, thus 
allowing the passage of time to temper the assumptions inherent in the earlier opinions. 
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"multimillion dollar recovery [and] exerted [ even more] pressure on 
Congress concerning granting reparations.,,16 
The suspicion that the Hohri class action lawsuit was a motivating 
factor is not without support in the record. There is ample evidence 
that Hohri was very much on the mind of Congress during its debate 
over the billP 
Moreover, Yamamoto postulated that the "model minority" ster-
eotype conveyed a number of silent messages which in turn conveyed 
the notion that if other minorities were the same as Japanese-Ameri-
cans and overcame hardship without government aid, they would be 
"rewarded" as well.1s Indeed, these fears are also well founded. Con-
temporaneous stories in the national and local popular press about 
how Asian Americans were a "model minority" were prevalent during 
Finally, there are compelling reasons to suggest that, in the first instance, the standard of 
review to decide the issues such as the incarceration of Japanese-Americans should not be 
whether the presumption of military necessity can be overcome. Professor Yamamoto has urged 
that in cases where the government imposes restrictions on civil liberties, except in circum-
stances of martial law, justifications of "national security" or "military necessity" should not 
replace the existing constitutional standard of review focusing on the right restricted. Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess 
and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and 
Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1,41-42 (1986). Indeed, the traditional standard of 
requiring a compelling state interest in cases of racial classification should encompass the ques-
tion of whether there is a national security interest at stake. Id. at 42. 
16. Yamamoto, supra note 15, at 225 n.8. See also, LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIOHTINO A 
WRONO: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAOE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES Acr OF 1988 177-78 
(1993) (noting that the class action suit may have made H.R. 442 "appear to be a relatively 
inexpensive for of redress .... [and] may have given representatives and senators an incentive 
to vote for H.R. 442"). For a full description of the motivation, organizing, and effect of the class 
action lawsuit see WILLIAM H. HOHRI, REPAIRINO AMERICA: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MOVEMENT 
FOR JAPANESE-AMERICAN REDRESS (1988). 
17. See reference made by Senator Stevens to "hundreds of billions of dollars" if a court 
awarded damages in terms of compensatory and punitive damages. 134 Congo Rec. S4329 (April 
20, 1988); reference by Senator Domenici to the ruling in district court that the Hohri class 
action had cause of action for losses. Id. at S4399. See also the reprinted statement of Richard 
K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 
reviewing related litigation including the Hohri class action. Id. at S4403-04; the reference by 
Senator Helms to the Hohri litigation as making legislation inappropriate. Id. at S4408. See also 
the statement by Congressman Frank that the bill would be in effect a settlement of the Hohri 
class action lawsuit. 133 Congo Rec. H7560 (September 17, 1987); the reference by Congressman 
Levine to Hohri lawsuit. Id. at H7571; the reference by Congressman Vento that the bill would 
"avoid court ordered reparations" if the Hohri class action were carried through to fruition. Id. 
at H7586; a reading of a letter by President Reagan into record by Congressman Frank support-
ing the bill and specifically citing the bill's ensuring that "acceptance of compensation under the 
legislation fully satisfies claims against the United States based on the unique circumstances of 
the internment." 134 Congo Rec. H6312 (Aug. 4, 1988). 
18. Yamamoto, supra note 15, at 238. Yamamoto points out that the model minority 
stereotype: 
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the time of debate and passage of the redress bill.19 It is no accident 
that there is ample evidence in the record of allusions to the "model 
minority" image of Asian Americans, and particularly of Japanese-
Americans.20 
Thus, Yamamoto, among others, has concluded that. Japanese-
Americans had a responsibility to scrutinize their "model minority" 
status, challenge governmental excesses of power domestically and 
internationally, and address issues affecting people of color.21 Indeed, 
monetary reparations for Japanese-Americans come with a responsi-
bility-a refusal to be used to excuse or perpetuate the racism that 
caused the internment in the first instance.22 
Id. 
1. minimizes the deep·seated harm inflicted upon Japanese-Americans by the misuse 
of the government's power; 
2. masks the problems of poor Asian communities and continuing discrimination 
against Asians; 
3. excuses government from acting affirmatively to eradicate discrimination and subor-
dination by emphasizing self-sufficiency; 
4. falsely privileges Asian-Americans at the expense of others driving a wedge between 
them and other groups of color. 
19. See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf, Paula Chin, Diane Weathers, Kim Foltz, Daniel Shapiro & 
Darby Junkin, Asian Americans: A "Model Minority," NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at 39; Daniel A. 
Bell, The Triumph of Asian-American; America's Greatest Success Story, NEW REpUBLIC, July 
15, 1985, at 24; Beverly McLoed, The Oriental Express; Asian American Immigrants Are Seen as 
a "Model" Minority on a Fast Track to Success, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July, 1986, at 48; David 
Brand, The New Whiz Kids; Why Asian Americans Are Doing So Wel~ and What It Costs Them, 
TIME, Aug. 31, 1987, at 42; OpinionlEditorial, The Asian Family: Garden of Values, SAN-DIEGO 
UNION TRIB., Feb. 4, 1986, at B6; Jim Spencer, Why Fu Lien Can Read, For Asian Americans, 
Learning Is a Family Obligation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1986, at C1. 
20. See reference by Senator Hecht that many Japanese-Americans were "multimillion-
aires today." 134 Congo Rec. S4328 (April 20, 1988); the reference by Senator Helms to the fact 
that "wealthy Asian Americans" were opposing Representative Dan Lundgren's reelection 
because Lundgren opposed individual reparations. Id. at S4413; the reference by Congressman 
Shumway (opposing bill) to Japanese Americans as "some of the most respectable, hard-work-
ing, loyal Americans that we have in this country." 133 Congo Rec. H7564 (September 17, 1987); 
the reference by Congressman Levine to Japanese Americans' "great contributions to out coun-
try" in "business, architecture, science, medicine, education" and that "[s]ome of our greatest 
scientists, educators and business leaders are Japanese-Americans." Id. at H7569; the reference 
by Congressman Packard to the fact that "[o]ur Japanese friends don't need [the reparations 
money]." Id. at H7581; the reference by Congressman Brown that some of Colorado's "finest 
citizens ... some of our most honest, hardworking, and productive human beings" came from the 
relocation camps to Colorado. Id. at H7594; the statement by Congressman Lehman stating that 
bill would serve to show "the respect we all have for the contributions that Japanese-Americans 
have made to our society." 134 Congo Rec. H6314 (August 4, 1988); the statement by Congress-
man Shumway that "[w]e count Japanese-Americans as some of the most respecta9le, hard-
working, loyal Americans that we have in this country." 133 Congo Rec. H7564 (September 17, 
1987). 
21. Yamamoto, supra note 15, at 240. 
22. Id. at 240 (citing address reprinted by the Asian Law Caucus by Mari Matsuda). 
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But the actual content of that refusal is a more difficult and com-
plex question. The refusal to be used to perpetuate subordination 
implies the existence of a shared political vision and a united political 
will. However difficult that consensus may be to achieve, part of the 
process of acting upon that responsibility lies in repudiating the polit-
ical and ideological values that were implicit during Congressional 
debate on the redress bill itself. Moreover, since influential economic 
forces benefitted from the relocation, Japanese-Americans are com-
pelled to be even more vigilant in scrutinizing and exposing connec-
tions to powerful economic interests when governmental decisions are 
made that have a negative impact upon the poor and people of 
color.23 
There is a particular irony about the debate on the redress bill. 
While there was general agreement, at least rhetorically, on the injus-
tice of the internment, all the glowing historical references centered 
around those contemporary political and ideological positions that 
justified and accommodated the decision to intern Japanese-Ameri-
cans.24 Those who at the time of internment saw it for the injustice 
and outrage that it was and chose to dissent continue to be silenced 
and unheralded even during the process of acknowledging their 
prescience. 
In essence, what Americans were being told by Congress to cele-
brate by the giving of redress to Japanese Americans, was that patriot-
ism-the kind of patriotism that does not resist injustice-gets 
23. Part of the cry for Japanese-American internment was raised by "influential agricul-
turalists who had long cast their covetous eyes over the coastal webwork of rich Japanese-owned 
land, a superb opportunity had thus become theirs for the long-sought expulsion of an unwanted 
minority." MICHl NISHIURA WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY 36 (1976). Weglyn noted that 
although comprising only 1 percent of California'S population, Japanese-Americans controlled 
over 50 percent of the commercial truck crops before internment such that the retail distribution 
of fruits and vegetables in Southern California "was already a firmly entrenched monopoly of 
Japanese Americans." fd. at 37. 
It was a common practice among the Issei to snatch up strips of marginal unwanted 
land which were cheap: swamplands, barren desert areas that Caucasians disdained to 
invest their labor in .... The extraordinary drive and morale of these hard-working, 
frugal Issei who could turn parched wastelands, even marshes, into lush growing 
fields-usually with help from the entire family-became legendary. In the course of 
the years, notably during periods of economic crisis, a hue and cry arose of "unfair 
competition" and accusations that "the Japs have taken over the best landl" 
fd.; see also ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD 
WAR II 13-14 (1993) (discussing the economic success and influence of the Japanese-American 
population in California and Washington before the internment camps and the backlash caused 
by it). 
24. It is somewhat analogous to condemning the Nazi invasion of France-and celebrating 
the Vichy government. 
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rewarded.25 Thus, the ideological baggage of the decision to redress 
the injustice of internment is the celebration of the "superpatriotic" 
response to it. It is this response-the ideological component of the 
model minority stereotype-and its celebration by Congress that con-
tains great lessons and holds great dangers for Japanese-Americans in 
particular and Asian Americans in general.26 
Part I will review the ideological themes that were put forward by 
Congressional supporters of the redress bill. These themes were 
echoed by specific political positions taken during the time of intern-
ment ,vithin the Japanese-American community that urged acquies-
cence to the relocation and counseled unquestioning obedience to all 
governmental action no matter how unjustified. Part II postulates 
how an uncritical adoption of the Congressional attitude toward Japa-
nese-Americans and the normative values inherent in Congressional 
approval of the redress bill implicate present day issues with respect to 
America's racial hierarchy and Asian Americans' place within it. 
Finally, it should be emphasized at the outset that I have no criti-
cism of the way organizations, individuals, and their families 
responded to relocation. My intent here is not to second guess with 
the benefit of perfect hindsight the particular decisions that individu-
als and families made about their response to relocation. I recognize 
how difficult it is for someone who did not experience it to understand 
the tenor of the racial hysteria after Pearl Harbor and the dangers 
faced by the Japanese-American community. Neither is it my purpose 
25. This is not to ignore the various reasons why Senators opposed giving any redress for 
the violation of Japanese-Americans' rights. Indeed, the very same racism equating Japanese 
nationals ,vith Japanese-Americans that caused the hysteria that lead to the camps forty-five 
years earlier was still evident on the floor of both the Senate and the House in 1988. 
Senator Helms proposed that no redress should be forthcoming to Japanese Americans until 
"the Government of Japan has fairly compensated the families of the men and women who were 
killed as a result of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." 134 Congo 
Rec. S4398 (April 20, 1988). This racist equation was echoed in the House by Congresswoman 
Bentley who stated that she was opposed to the legislation because American prisoners of war 
"who were treated cruelly and frequently tortured, sometimes tortured to death" were more 
deserving. 134 Congo Rec. H6309 (August 4, 1988). 
26. To put a celebration of a "super-patriotic" response to racial injustice in a contempo-
rary context, it is instructive to note that Ward Connerly, the African-American millionaire who 
as a Regent of California University and later as a leader for the effort to pass the eventually 
successful Proposition 209 California ballot measure that banned affirmative action in hiring, 
contracting and college admissions, has been described as "extravagantly patriotic." Barry 
Bearak, Questions of Race Run Deep for Foe of Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,1997, at A1, 20. 
It is reported that Connerly claims to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and the opening lines of the 
Declaration of Independence six to ten times a day. [d. at 20. 
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to dispute assertions that the response of many in the wartime Japa~ 
nese American community to prove their loyalty may have been the 
key to allowing Congressional acceptance of redress. Rather, my pur~ 
pose in reviewing the implications of the various positions taken by 
members of the Japanese-American community at the time of reloca~ 
tion is to seek out the lessons that hindsight might give to help ensure 
that internment or its equivalent will not happen again to us or any~ 
one else. Thus, there should be no mistake that the major thrust of 
my concern and criticism lies not with the response of any victim of 
this injustice, but with the lessons that Congress wants us to draw from 
it. 
I. THE TENOR OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE 
Throughout Congressional debate about the internment camps 
two consistent themes emerge-the injustice of the internment itself, 
and the patriotic response of the Japanese-American community 
throughout the internment ordeal exemplified by their acquiescence 
and unqualified support of it. Indeed, the halls of Congress rang with 
fervent denunciations of the camps, the atmosphere of racial paranoia, 
and the scapegoating of Japanese-Americans as profoundly un~Ameri~ 
can. Typical of the remarks in favor of the redress legislation were 
those of Congressman Rodino: 
The preamble of the Constitution speaks eloquently about the 
blessings of liberty, the most basic and fundamental of our civil 
rights. All American citizens enjoy these rights and they expect to 
be protected from arbitrary imprisonment by the Federal Govern-
ment. Some 40 years ago during World War II, the Federal Govern-
ment without providing any due process under law, sent nearly 
120,000 loyal American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese 
ancestry to remote internment camps. Many of these individuals, in 
the panic of sudden departures, lost their businesses, farms, and 
homes. Most of all they were deprived of their personal freedom. 
This great wrong to this day remains uncorrected. A truly great 
nation is worthy of its greatness when it recognizes that it has made 
mistakes. We now have the opportunity to recognize and to redress 
this grave injustice by the passage of [the redress bill],27 
Yet, despite this acknowledged injustice of the internment, there 
was much focus and laudatory praise of the acquiescent response to it. 
The sentiments of Congressman Yates are typical: 
27. Remarks of Congressman Rodino, 133 Congo Rec. H7SS9 (Sept. 17, 1987). 
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When the attack on Pearl Harbor came immediately the people of 
Japanese ancestry became targets for suspicion throughout the 
United States and Hawaii without cause or provocation. Japanese 
who had been living in California for many years were uprooted, 
homes destroyed, and they themselves placed behind barbed wire 
detention fences without a hearing or trial. ... [T]his should have 
been enough to kill the spirit of a less responsible group of people. 
But the reply from the Japanese parents was to sent [sic] their chil-
dren out from behind the wire fences into the American Armed 
Forces to fight the Nazis and the armed forces of their ancient 
homeland.28 
13 
The reference to the heroism and success of the segregated Japa-
nese-American army unit, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team is also 
typicaP9 The accolades were much deserved, and celebrated achieve-
ments about which all Americans, particularly Japanese-Americans, 
are proud.30 Yet, the Congressional debate is barren of favorable, 
indeed any, references to those heroic "others"-Japanese-American 
draft resisters who refused to fight for the United States until their 
families were freed from the camps.31 
28. 133 Cong. Rec. H7582 (Sept. 17, 1987). 
29. Indeed, the House number of the bill was H.R. 442. The accomplishments of the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team are without peer. The 442nd, and its predecessor unit the 100th 
Infantry Battalion from Hawaii, won 7 Presidential Unit Citations, 1 Congressional Medal of 
Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 588 Silver Stars, 9,486 Purple Hearts, fought in 7 major 
campaigns, and suffered 680 fatalities. See remarks of Senator Adams, 134 Congo Rec. S4277 
(Apr. 19, 1988); see also DANIELS, supra note 23, at 64 (noting that the 442nd was the "most 
decorated unit in the entire American Army" including one Congressional Medal of Honor). 
Daniels observed that: "[I]n what may have been the supreme irony of their service, the men of 
the 442nd helped to liberate the Nazi concentration camp at Dachau even while their parents 
and other relatives were still held in American concentration camps." ld. 
See also remarks about the 442nd of Senator Matsunaga, 134 Congo Rec., S4271 (Apr. 19, 
1988); Senator Inouye, id. at S4323 (Apr. 20, 1988); Sen. Matsunaga, id. at S4324, S4330; Con-
gressman Bonior, 133 Cong. Rec. H7556 (Sept. 17, 1987); Congressman Yates, id. at H7582 
(remarking no 442nd member deserted); Congressman Blaz, 134 Congo Rec. at H6310 (Aug. 4, 
1988); Congressman Fazio, id. at H6312; Congressman Mineta, Congo Rec., id. at H6313; Con-
gressman Lehman, id. at H6314. 
30. See remarks of Congressman Hoyer, 133 Congo Rec. H7580 (Sept. 17, 1987) (noting 
that of the 4500 men in the 442nd: 5300 Bronze Stars, 18,000 individual decorations, decorated 
by 18 allied nations including the French Croix de Guerre and the Italian Croce al Merito di 
Guerra were awarded). 
31. See HOHRI, supra note 16, at 172-75 (quoting hearing testimony of Jack Tono before the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ("CWRIC") in New York on 
November 23, 1984). Tono testified that he and a group of 62 other men protested the military 
service of Japanese Americans while their families were in camp "to right the wrong that was 
done to us as Japanese Americans." ld. at 174. 
In all, 315 internees were arrested for violations of Selective Service Laws. ld. at 6. They 
came from the camps at Topaz, Poston, Granada, Heart Mountain, Jerome, Minidoka, Rohwer, 
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In fact, the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain Relocation 
Center was organized to protest the violation of constitutional 
rights.32 In March 1944, it published a leaflet protesting the injustice 
of being ordered to join a segregated unit in the army without restora-
tion of their constitutional rights.33 The Committee declared: "We 
are not being disloyal. We are not evading the draft. We are all loyal 
Americans fighting for JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY RIGHT 
HERE AT HOME.,,34 
The seven leaders of the Heart Mountain draft resistance move-
ment, Kiyoshi Okamoto, Paul Nakadate, Ben Wakaye, Ken Yanagi, 
Frank Emi, Minoru Tamesa, and Sam Horino were convicted later 
that year on draft conspiracy charges.35 Yet these men and others who 
and Thle Lake. ld. at 14. Of the 315, 263 were convicted. ld. At Poston Relocation Center, 
approximately 200 young men were eventually indicted and tried for violations of the Selective 
Service Act for their refusal to be drafted to take up arms for freedom which neither they nor 
their parents enjoyed. WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 126-27, 303 n.37. 
During the Congressional debate on the bill, Congressman Pelosi did acknowledge the 
efforts to overturn the wartime convictions of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and 
Minoru Yasui. 134 Congo Rec. H6314 (Aug. 4, 1988). Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, 
and Minoru Yasui all individually challenged the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from desig-
nated military zones, based upon Executive Order 9066, signed by President Roosevelt on Feb. 
19, 1942. All were arrested and convicted of curfew and evacuation violations. Their cases went 
to the Supreme Court and all were denied justice in Hirabayashi V. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943); Yasui V. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). The other wartime legal challenge to relocation was Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) 
which granted her writ of habeas corpus releasing her from detainment holding that the War 
Relocation Authority (WRA) could not detain loyal citizens. However, the War Department 
was secretly notified of the Supreme Court's Endo decision ten days before it was announced, 
and it rescinded the exclusion and detention orders one day before the decision was handed 
down. HATAMIYA, supra note 16, at 24. 
Much has been written about the struggle of Korematsu. Yasui, and Hirabayashi to have 
their convictions reversed on writs of coram nobis (Korematsu V. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 
(N.D. Ca. 1984; Hirabayashi V. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui died before his 
petition could be finally adjudicated, see IRONS, infra at 29-30) as well as the critical roles played 
by activists, lawyers, and scholars. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF 
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989). It goes without saying that both their 
courageous resistance to the internment as well as their fight to seek judicial redress of their 
convictions was a major inspiration for the redress movement. See HATAMIYA, supra note 16, at 
171-72. Hatamiya observed that the successful coram nobis petitions which had shown the delib-
erate suppression of evidence by the government in 1943-44 that no threat of Japanese-Ameri-
can espionage or sabotage existed, had a major education and public relations impact. ld. at 170-
72. It "wiped away any legal basis for a nay vote on the redress legislation on the grounds that 
there had been at least some military necessity for the orders." ld. at 172. 
32. ld. at 13. 
33. ld. at 33. 
34. ld. (emphasis original). 
35. ld. at 13. See also DANIELS, supra note 23, at 64 (noting that 85 inmates of Heart 
Mountain relocation camp refused military induction on the basis that so long as there was 
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also sacrificed for hallowed democratic principles went unnoticed dur-
ing the congressional debate. 
The congressional decision to celebrate the "blind obedience" 
response to injustice rather than resistance to it would be merely 
short-sighted if done in isolation. However, this perspective is consis-
tent throughout the congressional debate and sends a clear message 
about what lessons that the Congress and President Reagan who later 
signed the bill hoped the law would teach to Japanese-Americans and 
people of color in general. 
Reference to the redress bill both before and after its passage is 
striking in one unique aspect. There is an express and consistent con-
nection made between the bill and the political perspective of Mike 
Masaoka, the Executive Secretary and spokesperson of the Japanese 
American Citizens League (JACL) at the time of the internment.36 
internment, there was no obligation to serve in the military). Daniels notes that of the 385 men 
from Heart Mountain who entered the army, eleven were killed and fifty-two were wounded. 
ld. There were 3,600 men who entered the army directly from the camps of which at least 172 
were killed in action, 590 were wounded and fifteen declared missing. ld. 
The JACL, in 1990, adopted a resolution that recognized those Japanese American 
draft resisters who declared their loyalty to their country but were also dedicated to the 
principle of defending their civil rights, were \villing to make significant sacrifices to 
uphold their beliefs ... in a different form from those who sacrificed their lives on the 
battlefields; and that they too deserve a place of honor and respect in the history of 
Americans of Japanese ancestry. 
CHICAGO SHTh1PO, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1 (quoting the Hokubei Mainichi); see also ASIAN WEEK, 
June 29, 1990, at 12. 
36. See, e.g., remarks of Congressman Matsui inserting Masaoka's "Japanese American 
Creed" written in 1941 into the record: 
I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very back-
ground makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this Nation. I 
believe in her institutions, ideals and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her 
history; I trust in her future. She has granted me liberties and opportunities such as no 
individual enjoys in this world today. She has given me an education befitting kings. 
She has entrusted me \vith the responsibility of franchise. She has permitted me to 
build a home, earn a livelihood, to worship, think, speak, and act as I please-as a free 
man equal to every other man. 
Although some individuals may discriminate against me I shall never become bit-
ter or lose faith, for I know such persons are not representative of the majority of the 
American people. true, I shall do all in my power to discourage such practices, but I 
shall do it in the American way: above board, in the open, through courts of law, by 
education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and consideration. I am 
firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair pay [sic] will judge 
citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and achievement, and not on the basis 
of physical characteristics. 
Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have 
received innumerable benefits from her I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times 
and in all places, to support her Constitution, to obey her laws, to respect her Flag, to 
defend her against all enemies, foreign or domestic, to actively assume my duties and 
obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, on the 
hope that I may become a better American in a greater America. 
134 Congo Rec. H6308-09 (Aug. 4, 1988). 
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This is significant because the position of the JACL, and in particular 
Masaoka, at the time of the internment was one of complete and 
uncritical support for it. It was the JACL that urged unquestioning 
compliance with it and actively cooperated with the government in 
suppressing any dissent within the Japanese-American community.37 
Typical of the sentiments expressed about Masaoka and the activ-
ity of the wartime JACL are Congressman Edward's remarks on the 
floor of Congress on December 21,1987.38 Edwards's ostensible pur-
pose was to put into the record the news of the recent publication of 
Masaoka's autobiography, "They Call Me Moses Masaoka.,,39 In the 
beginning of his remarks Edwards alluded to the fact that the House 
of Representatives had recently approved the Civil Liberties Act and 
that it only was awaiting approval by the Senate. He then went on to 
recognize Masaoka's participation in the redress issue itself.40 Quite 
remarkably, he then devoted a substantial portion of his remarks to a 
ringing endorsement of the political positions that had been taken by 
Masaoka and the JACL during the period of internment: 
Masaoka explains in considerable detail the reasons for JACL's con-
troversial cooperation in the initial evacuation orders, noting that 
even with the benefit of almost half a century of hindsight, he does 
not know of any knowledgeable individual, evacuee or others, who 
has advanced a viable, practical, and effective alternative to their 
reluctant and difficult but patriotic decision. As a former FBI agent 
Within two years of the articulation of the creed, Japanese-Americans were behind barbed 
wire. See DANIELS, supra note 23, at 20. 
Masaoka was also eulogized on the floor of Congress after his death in 1991 by Congress-
man Dixon, 137 Cong. Rec. E2854-02 (August 2,1991); Congressman Minetta, 137 Congo Rec. 
H5890-01 and H5885-86 (July 25, 1991); Congressman Abercrombie, id. at H5891; Congressman 
Frank, id. at H5891-02; Congressman Yates, id. at H5892-06; Congressman Levine, id. at H5896; 
Congressman Berman, id. at H5896-97; Congressman Lehman, id. at H5897; Congresswoman 
Boxer, id.; Congressman Lantos, id.; Congressman Mavroules, id. at E2726-27; Congressman 
Edwards, id. at H5886-87; Congressman Matsui, id. at H5887-88; Senator Inouye, 137 Congo Rec. 
S9099 (June 28, 1991). In each of these eulogies, allusions were made to his leadership in the 
passing of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. For a discussion of the positions on the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988 by the wartime JACL leadership such as Masaoka, see infra notes 80-82 and accom-
panying text. 
It should be noted that this tribute came after the original funding was appropriated on 
November 21, 1989 when President Bush signed H.R.2991 establishing redress as an entitlement 
program. However, it was not until March 1992 that amendments were introduced in the House 
and Senate to extend redress benefits to an additional 20,000 eligible recipients who were not to 
receive payment under the original entitlement program. See HATAMIYA, sllpra note 16, at 186. 
37. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text. 
38. 133 Congo Rec. H11938-03 (Dec. 21, 1987). 
39. Id. 
40. ld. 
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who also was very much aware of the true mood and atmosphere of 
the situation on the Pacific Coast, however, I can vouch for the fact 
that there appeared to be no other pragmatic or realistic choice but 
to comply with the military, which those of Japanese ethnicity did 
without violence or terrorism.41 
17 
What is noticeably absent in Edwards's defense of Masaoka's histori-
cal role is any reference to the reasons why JACL's cooperation was 
"controversial" in the first instance. Indeed, it only hints at other con-
temporaneous perspectives that existed within the Japanese-American 
community at the time. 
II. RESISTANCE TO INCARCERATION 
The relocation of the entire Japanese American population of the 
West Coast did not proceed without meeting resistance. In fact, "over 
100 Japanese-Americans deliberately violated at least one of the 
orders.,,42 Moreover, other than the resistance to the draft, even 
within the internment camps and under armed guard, there were peri-
odic strikes and even riots resulting in numerous casualties and fatali-
ties from the army's suppression of them.43 Numerous acts of overt 
mass resistance have been documented: 
41. ld. It should be noted that my purpose in looking at the political positions of Masaoka 
and its reflection in the activities and positions taken by the JACL during the internment is not 
to denigrate either Masaoka or the JACL's achievements. Indeed, many credit Masaoka and the 
JACL with being a significant force in the final granting of citizenship rights for the Issei in 1952. 
See WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 268 (which she calls a "veritable tour de force for the Japanese 
American Citizens League ... achieved largely through the intensive lobbying efforts of its 
Washington representative, Mike Masaoka"). Moreover, this piece is not primarily meant to be 
criticism of the internment position taken by the JACL and its supporters, although there are 
many troubling questions about its wartime activities. The piece is directed at the politicalles-
sons that may be drawn from the experience and these political positions to avoid the same kind 
of tragedy happening again, not only to Japanese Americans, but to any other people. More-
over, it is in recognition that while there are no places officially called "internment camps" in the 
present, there are conditions for many people of color whether it be in the urban ghettos or on 
"reservations" or in penal institutions, that are the result of social, political, and economic barri-
ers that may be even more difficult to surmount than the barbed wire ones which held my par-
ents and relatives captive. 
42. See HATAMIYA, supra note 16, at 23. 
43. William Hohri articulates three attempts at redress during the camps: (1) the attempt 
by James Omura in Colorado to organize legal action against the United States to restore civil 
and citizenship rights for Japanese-Americans in 1942; a letter written from inside the camps by 
Joseph Y. Kurihara in 1943 in which he proposes $5000 for "each and every evacuee"; and (3) 
Kiyoshi Okamoto and James Omura leading the draft resistance at Heart Mountain Relocation 
Camp, and later in 1946 Okamoto establishing 'The Fair Rights Committee" to seek restitution 
for the internees. See HOHRI, supra note 16, at 28-34. 
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(1) a farm strike at Thle Lake Relocation Center on August 15, 
1942, over inadequate food rations, work speed-up, wages and work 
clothing allotment;44 
(2) a construction strike at Thle Lake Relocation Center on Sep-
tember 3, 1942, over layoffs without pay, reduction in the Japanese-
American crew in favor of white crew members, and lack of 
clothing;45 
(3) a petition campaign resulting in 9,000 signatures and a mess 
hall "slowdown" at Thle Lake Relocation Center, on October 12, 
1942, over food distribution and mess hall conditions;46 
(4) a general strike at Poston Relocation Center on November 15, 
1942, over the arrest of two camp residents suspected in the beating of 
FBI informers;47 
(5) a riot at Manzanar Relocation Center on December 5, 1942, 
over arrests resulting from the beating of a suspected "inu," in which 
machine guns were fired and gas bombs thrown at camp residents by 
soldiers resulting in 10 wounded and 2 killed;48 
(6) a strike by a coal crew at Thle Lake Relocation Center on 
October 7, 1943, over working conditions;49 
(7) a strike by farm workers at Thle Lake Relocation Center on 
October 15, 1943, over dangerous working conditions having resulted 
in an accident injuring 29 workers and killing one;50 
(8) a hunger strike by 200 detainees at Thle Lake Relocation 
Center on December 31, 1943, over their arrest as a result of the 
imposition of martial law at Thle Lake;51 
(9) a mass demonstration at Thle Lake Relocation Center on 
November 1, 1943, over general conditions including racism of Cauca-
sian personnel toward camp residents.52 
44. See DOROTIiY S. THOMAS & RICHARD NISHIMOTO, THE SPOILAGE: JAPANESE-AMERI. 
CAN EVACUATION AND REsETTLEMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 41-42 (1969). 
45. Id. at 43. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 45-49. JACL members were often suspected by camp residents of being inform-
ers or "inus." The literal Japanese translation of the term is "dog." See THOMAS & NISHIMOTO, 
supra note 44, at 45-52. 
48. Id. at 49-51; see also WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 121-25. 
49. THOMAS & NISHIMOTO, supra note 44, at 113. 
50. Id. at 114-15. 
51. Id. at 174. 
52. See WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 162. 
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Indeed, the attitude among many camp inmates was one of dis-
quiet and resistance over many issues, and disagreement over the 
extent to which the community should cooperate with the government 
was both widespread and contentious. This cleavage over the reaction 
to the internment might be best illustrated by the reaction to the 
administration of the "Loyalty Oath" to internees who were seven-
teen or 01der.53 The outrageous insensitivity of the requirement of the 
oath taking aside, for the incarcerated Japanese American population, 
it created unfathomable community pressures.54 
The Loyalty Oath questions permitted only "yes" or "no" 
answers. However, irrespective of their political views, the fact 
remained that "yes" answers to the loyalty questions for the Issei, who 
were not citizens of the United States, left them with the possibility of 
becoming people ,vithout a country.55 Some felt that a "yes" answer 
could be a trap to identify Japan sympathizers since it could be inter-
preted as an admission of prior allegiance to Japan.56 A "no" answer 
to question twenty-seven ,vith respect to armed forces service could 
have less to do ,vith disloyalty than with repugnance for the fact of 
incarceration.57 Indeed, complying with the evacuation itself could be 
seen as the ultimate test of loyalty.58 Many wondered whether the 
"yes/yes" responders were going to be "rewarded" by being drafted 
while the "no-no" responders were to be "rewarded" with continued 
incarceration or worse.59 Indeed, some Issei feared that a "yes" 
response would get them thrown out of camp without resources.60 
53. The "Loyalty Oath" in actuality consisted of two identical questions in two different 
forms-one for draft age Nisei, the "Statement of United States Citizenship of Japanese Ances-
try," and the other for Issei and female Nisei, "Application for Leave Clearance." They were as 
follows: 
No.27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat 
duty, wherever ordered? 
No. 28. \Vill you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and 
faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign and domestic 
forces, and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to 
any other foreign government, power or organization? 
See WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 136. 
54. Incredibly, this oath was administered to a population that had just been uprooted, 
terrorized and unjustly incarcerated by their government. The action by the WRA has been 
characterized as one of "incredible stupidity," DANIELS, supra note 23, at 68, and "colossal 
folly," WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 135. 
55. See WEGL'l.'N, supra note 23, at 136-37. 




60. See DANIELS, supra note 23, at 69. 
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In any event, almost 9,000 residents answered question twenty-
eight "no" and were classified as "disloyal," although the precise rea-
sons for that answer probably could not be neatly assumed or catego-
rized.61 Those deemed "disloyal" were all transferred to Thle Lake 
Relocation Center; those deemed "loyal" at Thle Lake were trans-
ferred to other camps.62 The aftermath of this cleavage was 
devastating: 
On the surface, this innocuous questionnaire resulted in the transfer 
of 18,711 evacuees between centers for the purpose of segregation 
and in 4,224 cases, eventual repatriation .... In actuality, the "Loy-
alty Oath" served to segregate generation against generation, reli-
gion against religion, family against family, and wreaked havoc on 
households and individuals-a veritable civil war with no winners.63 
Thus, the tributes in connection to the political positions and 
choices of Masaoka and the JACL are more than just recognition of 
an individual's or an organization's contributions to his country. 
Given the history of contemporaneous and relatively substantial 
resistance to internment-a governmental action which even the gov-
ernment now concedes was without justification- the extraordinary 
recognition and official government imprimatur of what some would 
consider the extreme positions taken by the JACL and its spokesper-
son Masaoka require greater scrutiny.64 
III. THE WARTIME JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZEN'S 
LEAGUE UNDER MASAOKA 
The wartime JACL was a group of young Nisei struggling to culti-
vate a leadership role in the Japanese-American community.65 Before 
61. ld. at 69. 
62. ld. at 70. 
63. HOHRI, supra note 16, at 136 (quoting the testimony before the Commission on War-
time Relocation and Internment of Civilians of Lawson Inada, professor of English at Southern 
Oregon College and well regarded poet). 
64. It should be noted at the outset that the members of the JACL such as Edison Uno, 
Raymond Okamura, and William Hohri have consistently played an active role in pushing the 
organization to take stands on issues of equity and racial justice since the 1960s. Indeed, it was 
Edison Uno and other JACL members who first proposed the idea of redress. See HOHRI, supra 
note 16, at 37-38. 
65. See WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 44-45. There is some evidence that although the JACL 
leadership had claimed to "speak for" the Japanese-American community during the intern-
ment, its actual membership barely reached 2000. This information is contained on page 15, 
section lIB of a report compiled in 1989 by Deborah Lim, an attorney and Asian Studies instruc-
tor at San Francisco State University who was hired by the JACL to research the wartime activ-
ity of the organization. See, e.g., Sheila Muto, Controversy over Report on JACL Wartime Role, 
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the evacuation, it was the Issei who provided the Japanese-American 
community's leadership and stability.66 The JACL's overall political 
agenda was one of "super-patriotism" in the face of racial and eco-
nomic persecution.67 Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the JACL moved 
toward "formal collaboration" with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion to "inform on all individuals who appeared to be a danger.,,68 
Indeed, in practically every instance the JACL stood in vocal and 
active opposition to Japanese-American resistance to internment, and 
enthusiastically endorsed and supported the actions of the govern-
ment with respect to internment and suppression of dissent: 
-members of the JACL leadership were involved in identifying 
noncitizen Issei and Kibei community leaders to the FBI and Office of 
Naval Intelligence before Pearl Harbor;69 
-acted as government informants to identify those they "sus-
pected of disloyalty" before the evacuation;70 
-acted as government informants inside the internment camps 
identifying "dissidents" and "disloyals";71 
-the JACL leadership, including Masaoka, rather than advocat-
ing for Japanese-American interests to the War Relocation Authority 
(WRA), the governmental agency responsible for the maintenance of 
the camps, became actual employees of the WRA in exchange for 
freedom of movement;72 
12 AsIAN WEEK, Nov. 23, 1990, at 1. Her mandate was the result of a resolution passed at the 
JACL's 1988 national convention to have the organization apologize for some of its actions dur-
ing World War II. See id. In 1990, Lim completed her research and delivered a report ("The 
Lim Report") which was highly critical of the organization's activities but, the JACL released 
only a su=ary of her report deleting most of the critical content at its convention in 1990. See 
Clifford Uyeda, JACL's Report on Dissidents, PAC. CITIZEN, Aug. 31, 1990, at 5. In 1994, the 
organization agreed to release the original report. Takeshi Nakayama, Lim Report to Be 
Released at National Convention, RAFu SHIMPO, May 24, 1994. Moreover, I have looked at 
much of the original source material from which the Lim Report based its conclusions. 
66. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 77 (1983). 
67. ld.; see also WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 44-45. 
68. IRONS, supra note 66, at 79. The Anti-A'ili Committee was formed in 1941 by the 
Southern California JACL chapters to work \vith the FBI and governmental agencies to inform 
on the Japanese-American co=unity. See id. In Seattle and San Francisco similar groups, 
called "Emergency Defense Councils" were formed. See Deborah K. Lim, Research Report 
Prepared for Presidential Select Co=. on JACL Resolution #7, at 25 (1990) (unpublished 
report, on file ,vith the JACL in San Francisco). 
69. See Lim, supra note 68, at 2-10. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 71-74. 
72. See id. at 55-64. 
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-the JACL urged charges of sedition be brought against the 
draft resisters of Heart Mountain;73 
-the JACL considered any "no" answer to the Loyalty Oath an 
expression of disloyalty irrespective of the reason for the "no" 
answer?4 
In fact, there is evidence to the effect that in his capacity as Exec-
utive Secretary for the JACL, Masaoka proposed a "suicide battalion" 
of Japanese-Americans whose loyalty would be assured by having 
families and friends held by the government as hostages?S Even more 
disturbing was Masaoka's proposal in 1942 to recommend to the gov-
ernment that Japanese-Americans be branded, stamped, and put 
under the supervision of the federal government, put into "labor con-
centration camps" to be utilized as "cheap labor" in the sugar beet 
fields, and that internees be used for road building in western states in 
return for resettlement?6 
That this extreme "superpatriotic" response to an acknowledged 
racial injustice would be celebrated by Congress is troubling.77 Yet, in 
the clear vision that hindsight gives, this blindly obedient response on 
the part of the JACL could be simply written off as an understandable 
73. See id. at 88. Saburo Kido, the JACL president during 1940-41 wrote in the Pacific 
Citizen, the newspaper of the JACL, referring to the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain, 
"Any person who incites or encourages any citizen to evade the draft is assuming a grave respon-
sibility. It is needless to say the offense constitutes sedition." Id. 
74. See id. at 80-81. The conclusions reached by the Lim Report were circulated to the 
Japanese-American co=unity after the successful redress campaign and caused a great contro-
versy. See, e.g., Frank Abe, JACL Study Critical of Its Own Wartime Policies, INT'L EXAMINER, 
June 20, 1990, at 7; see also Frank Abe, Report Says Wartime JACL Leaders Collaborated, RAFu 
SHIMPO, June 12, 1990, at 1. 
75. See WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 38. 
76. See Lim, supra note 68, at 36. 
77. Ironically, given the close cooperation with the FBI by the JACL, it is remarkable to 
discover that the agency did not return the JACL's fealty to them. A wartime FBI survey of the 
Japanese co=unity within the camps indicated their view was that: 
One of the greatest causes for internal disorder has been perhaps the Japanese-Ameri-
can Citizens League. The members of the Japanese-American Citizens League have 
been very outspoken in proclaiming their loyalty to the United States. It is, of course, 
co=endatory that these individuals would be loyal to this country; however, there are 
some indications that their views are as political as patriotic. It is the consensus of 
opinion among the Japanese that the Japanese-American Citizens league, in collabora-
tion \vith the United States Government, "sold them out" and did not put up a fight to 
block relocation. This feeling is so predominant that the Japanese now refer to Mike 
Masuoko [sic], the national president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, as 
Moses Masuoko [sic], stating that he "led them out of California".[sic] Many of the 
individuals who receive beatings have been members of the Japanese-American Citi-
zens League, and as such are individuals who either cooperated with the Government 
agencies or were active in sponsoring loyalty programs. 
Id. at 70-71 (quoting FBI survey of ten relocation camps). 
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reaction to eJ..'treme and dangerous conditions. However, the apologia 
for oppressive governmental action was a consistent response from 
the old-line JACL leadership lead by Masaoka, long after the intern-
ment and World War II was over. For example, although by 1972 the 
JACL, pushed by its more progressive caucuses and chapters, had 
adopted a resolution in opposition to the War in Vietnam, only two 
years earlier pro-Vietnam War sentiments were common for the old-
line JACL activists?8 What is even more revealing is the kind of 
stance taken by Masaoka during the early campaign for redress itself. 
In the early 1970s, the JACL, pushed by the efforts of members 
like Edison Uno, adopted a series of resolutions in favor of redress 
legislation and in 1976 formed the National Committee for Redress?9 
However, in 1979, the JACL adopted a position supporting legislation 
for a study commission rather than redress legislation itself.so As 
such, the JACL did not support the first redress legislation introduced 
by Congressman Lowry in November, 1979.81 Indeed, at the Senate 
78. See Official Minutes of the Japanese American Citizens League 22nd Biennial National 
Convention at 59-60 (on file with author) (urging "rapid" end of United States participation in 
the war); see also HOHRI, supra note 16, at 37-38. Hohri describes the attempt by "Sansei radi-
cals" in 1970 at the JACL national convention to push the JACL to take positions against the 
Vietnam War and to take more aggressive positions on civil rights issues, and the "outrage" by 
many members of the organization. See id. As one of those "Sansei radicals" if memory serves, 
I remember that Masaoka was reported as not being pleased with our demonstrations. 
79. See HOHRI, supra note 16, at 38, 41. 
80. See id. at 44. The JACL retreat was an impetus for the creation of other redress organi-
zations such as the National Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR). William Hohri, 
JACL member and one of the founders of NCJAR, recalls that the reasons given for the retreat 
were "hauntingly similar" to the reasons given "for the JACL's collaboration with the govern-
ment's program of exclusion and detention. Were we being sold down the river again?" ld. at 
45. He muses: 
[T]he accommodationist role of the JACL is both symbolic and real. The symbol is 
expressed by terms such as "Quiet American" and "Model Minority" .... That's the 
direction the JACL has urged upon [Japanese-Americans] with its motto, "Better 
Americans in a Greater America." The motto's corollary, also adopted by the JACL 
was "The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number." the motto and corollary implied 
that "Better Americans" are more "American," and more "American" was what the 
majority of Americans were: white Americans. Japanese-Americans were to become as 
much like white Americans as possible; failing that, they were to be quiet and 
accommodating. 
ld. at 128-29. 
The other major group formed to articulate redress purposes was the National Coalition for 
Redress/Reparations (NCRR) formed in 1980. See HATAMIYA, supra note 16, at 142. The vari-
ous formations and their different strategies to attain redress are beyond the scope of this article. 
However, like any political movement, different views emerged. For some perspectives of these 
differences, see HOHRI, supra note 16; HATAMIYA, supra note 16, at 138-142. 
81. H.R. 5977 ("The Lowry Bill") allocated $15,000 per internee. H.R. 5977, 96th Congo 
(1979). This bill was opposed in testimony by Masaoka before the House Judiciary Committee 
on June 2, 1980. See HOHRI, supra note 16, at 61, 76-77. 
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hearings held on the redress issue on March 18, 1980, Masaoka pro· 
posed an alternative-to-redress approach that would not compensate 
individual victims.82 In fact, in a crowning irony, he "argued passion· 
ately against redress for renunciants and draft resisters."83 
Thus, Congressional solicitude towards the very people whose 
political views accommodated and, indeed, helped to exacerbate the 
very injustice that Congress condemned by the redress bill sends an 
unambiguous message-there are rewards for acquiescence. 
In a 1997 conference held at the University of California Los 
Angeles entitled, "Voices of Japanese American Redress," there were 
several themes that emerged as reported by the community press. 
The conference was sponsored primarily by the Civil Liberties Public 
Education Fund, and its purpose was, as one organizer stated, "to see 
the broad spectrum of ideas that still exists among the different indi-
viduals that were involved in the redress movement.,,84 
One theme reported was that the redress movement was an his· 
toric grassroots event.85 Another theme that emerged was that 
redress could not have been accomplished without the "patriotism" 
exhibited by the Japanese-American community in response to their 
incarceration.86 What is disturbing about the reported discussions 
around this issue was that there did not appear to be any focus on the 
implications of and the dangers inherent in the notion that despite the 
clear injustice of the incarceration, congressional redress would not 
have been possible unless there had been a history of acquiescence to 
it. Instead, there was only heated discussion on what the appropriate 
role of the JACL should have been at the time of internment. 87 
82. See HOHRI, supra note 16, at 64. 
83. [d. at 118. 
84. Takeshi Nakayama, Grassroots Lobbying Created Legitimacy for Redress, Sept. 18, 
1997, at 1 (quoting conference organizer Dr. Mitchell Maki). 
85. See Martha Nakagawa, Redress Revisited, RAFu SHIMPO, Sept. 12, 1997, at At (calling 
it "one of the greatest grassroots effort in modem American history"). 
86. Representative Robert Matsui stated: 
There could be no question about our patriotism after people like Rudy [Tokiwa], who 
was locked up in camp went to war for the U.S. I don't think redress would have 
happened without the 442nd, without those who gave up their lives and gave them-
selves for the war effort while their families were interned. 
Takeshi Nakayama, Rare Victory of Spirit over Numbers, RAFu SHIMPO, Sept. 16, 1997, at A2. 
87. There are reports of a heated exchange between Frank Chin and Fred Hirasuna. Chin 
took the position that the JACL failed to defend Japanese Americans during incarceration, and 
Hirasuna took the position that cooperation with the government was the only viable alternative 
at the time. See Nakagawa, supra note 85. 
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Whatever the merits of each position in that debate, that particu-
lar argument obscures and detracts from discussion of a much larger 
and more troubling issue. Even if one assumes that the JACL accom-
modationist course was a "better" alternative to outright resistance to 
the incarceration, the question remains whether that response should 
be what we as a nation and community celebrate and commemorate 
when we look back on the experience. The fact that segments of the 
wartime Japanese-American community either felt or were in actual-
ity forced to cooperate enthusiastically with their captors should be 
viewed as a source of national tragedy as well as a testament to the 
\vill to endure and prevail of the Japanese-American community. 
Shouldn't the lesson that we as a nation learn from the experience of 
Japanese-Americans be that when injustice happens we should listen 
better to the dissenters and the protesters against that injustice? With 
that as our national lesson, we as a society are better assured that no 
other community in the future will be forced to humiliate themselves 
in the face of their oppression in order to surVive. 
Moreover, deflecting the debate away from that issue to one 
solely over the wartime role of the JACL forces a defense of its war-
time position which reinforces a "superpatriotic" accommodationist 
stance in the present. In his criticism of Frank Chin's position that the 
JACL sacrificed long-term Japanese-American interests by capitula-
tion, Fred Hirasuna, a JACL member from Central California wrote: 
Those young people who volunteered or were willingly drafted for 
military service, in spite of constitutional wrongs committed against 
them and their families by their own government, showed more real 
courage and more commitment to the overall cause of Japanese 
Americans that any other single group, more than the Heart Moun-
tain [draft resister] group.88 
However, the issue should not be framed in terms of who showed 
more courage, but why were either forced to make that kind of a 
choice, and why has Congress decided to celebrate one choice, but not 
the other. Japanese-Americans should not allow ourselves to be 
placed in the position of accepting reparations at the same price that 
we were asked to pay when we were incarcerated in the first place-
accommodation of governmental racial injustice. Aside from its other 
and collateral pernicious effects, it places us back at our original 
humiliation.89 
88. Letter to the Editor, RAFu SHIMPO, Sept. 27, 1997, at 3. 
89. Since my source for the goings on at the UCLA conference are taken from press 
accounts, I am reluctant to comment upon issues that may have been unaddressed. However, it 
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IV. THE DANGER OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATIONISM 
FOR ASIAN AMERICANS 
The carrot of political reward for political accommodation is a 
particular temptation for Asian Americans, for Asian Americans find 
themselves in a peculiar place in the developing racial hierarchy.90 If 
Asian Americans accept their model minority role, it no doubt will 
come with the "reward" of higher racial status. As one John O. 
Calmore has explicitly predicted: "I do believe, however, that domi-
nant America will attempt to situate Asians, Pacific Islanders, and 
Latinos squarely within its efforts to determine who will be 'white' in 
the twenty-first century."91 
As such, in the search for more sophisticated paradigms to under-
stand and dismantle all forms of racial subordination, it is imperative 
not to confuse the subtlety of the various paradigms with necessity to 
focus the primary attack upon the overall operation of white 
supremacy.92 
was reported that although there were discussions of unfinished work, i.e. the cases of Latin 
American Japanese who were incarcerated, there was no report of discussions about how and 
whether Japanese-Americans could participate in and support the claims of other groups such as 
Hawaiians and African Americans for reparations and racial redress. See Nakagawa, supra note 
85, at AI. 
90. For a discussion of the "buffer" role Asian Americans often play in contemporary 
American racial politics, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
91. John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay for 
"Naked People Longing To Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. 25, 63 (1997) (quoting RACE TRAITOR 
275 (Noel Ignatiev & John Garvey eds., 1996». 
92. In the turning away from a black/white paradigm of race relations to a more complex 
view of racial dynamics, there are attendant political dangers for people of color. See Chris K. 
Iijima, Deconstmction, Reconstmction, We-constmction: Reclaiming the Politics of Racial Identity 
and Reflections on the Critique of the BlacklWhite Paradigm, 29 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47 
(1997). 
Professor Eric Yamamoto has articulated an analytical framework for understanding the 
operation of dominance and subordination outside the old BlacklWhite paradigm without sacri-
ficing the primary focus on white supremacy. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race 
Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 891 
(1997). According to Professor Yamamoto, situated group power involves four understandings: 
(1) simultaneity (racial group can be viewed as oppressed and oppressive simultaneously 
depending on power relationships involved); (2) positionality (focuses on actor's "power posi-
tion within a given context [to identify its potential as an agent or object of domination, or 
both"), id. at 892; (3) differentiation (how within a system or context of racial domination 
"where racial minorities are struggling against white domination, a nonwhite racial group 
acquires and exercises power over another", id.; and "differential racialization and differential 
disempowerment" recognizing that racial groups are racialized differently such that: 
varying historical experiences and current socio-economic conditions create different 
racial images, status and power among racial groups, and those differences contribute 
to intergroup conflict. Both ideas account for differential racial group agency in the 
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To meet the exigencies of contemporary American race hierar-
chy, a more explicitly tiered rather than binary racial system of subor-
dination is developing.93 On one hand, there will be a continued 
bottom level of subordinated people of color-particularly African-
Americans. However, there is a growing middle tier in which a 
subordinated "model minority," Asians and some Latinos, will be 
given some racial and class privileges in return for being used as both 
a buffer and diversion.94 
This phenomenon is not without some precedent in the United 
States.95 In research done in 1967 of the relatively large Chinese pop-
ulation (approximately 1200) in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta the 
author noted that despite the rigidly segregated nature of the Delta 
society and the social and economic gulf between dominant whites 
construction and maintenance of racial hierarchies and differential racial group respon-
sibility for dismantling those hierarchies. Rooted in critical sociology, differential 
racialization and disempowerment thus acknowledge that racial groups, even while 
themselves struggling against domination by others, sometimes, and in complex ways, 
exercise power over others and that this exercise of power occasionally generates or 
exacerbates interracial conflict. 
id. at 892-93; and (4) dominance/transformation ("The extent of racial group's power over 
another is determined in part by its alignment with other ... actors .... "), id. at 893. Thus, 
power "generates racial harms for which the more powerful group bears responsibility" and 
transformation "reflects an acceptance of responsibility and affirmative steps toward interracial 
healing." Id. at 894. 
93. See Yamamoto, supra note 15, at 238 n.67 (referring to Professor Mari Matsuda's fear 
that Asian Americans could reinforce a racial hierarchy "with white on top, black at bottom, and 
yellow in the middle"). 
94. See Natsu Saito Jenga, Finding Our Voices, Teaching Our Truth: Reflections on Legal 
Pedagogy and Asian American Identity, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 81, 83-84 (1995) (noting 
how the "model minority" myth places Asian Americans in a racial hierarchy below European 
Americans and above African Americans and LatinoiLatinas); see also Neil Gotanda, Multicul-
turalism and Racial Stratification, in MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 238, 240 (Avery F. Gordon & 
Christopher Newfield eds., 1996) (African-Americans measured against model minority myth 
and thus "monitored" by Asian-American stereotype). 
Indeed, as Frank H. Wu has stated: 
Under some circumstances, Asian Americans have been granted the status of honorary 
whites. In anomalous instances, whites may accept Asian Americans as white, despite 
de jure discrimination. Official school desegregation, for example, could be ignored to 
permit Asian Americans to attend a white institution. Nevertheless, there do not 
appear to be many, if any at all, court cases characterizing Asian Americans as whites, 
where that characterization favors the individual thus identified. 
Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 225, 248 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
95. See infra notes 111-16 for a discussion of Asians in South Africa under apartheid. It is 
worth noting that Japanese businessmen were accorded a "honorary white" status due to Japan's 
importance in South Africa economy. See, e.g., Roger Thurow, This Time, Japan Would Rather 
Stay No.2, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1987; Jenga, supra note 94, at 93 n.26. Of course, the very 
notion of an "honorary white" serves to further codify the notion of white supremacy since "it 
promotes whiteness as an ideal." Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 ASIAN 
LJ. 185,207 (1996) (revie\ving WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE». 
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and subordinate blacks, the Chinese had "managed to leap that 
chasm.,,96 
Originally classed with blacks, they are now viewed as essentially 
"white." The color bar stands, but they have crossed over it. More-
over, in some communities they bridge it anew every day, for they 
still stand in a sense as an intermediate group. Negroes do not con-
sider them exactly white; Caucasians do not consider them black. 
They are privileged and burdened with an ambiguous racial 
identity.97 
Moreover, the entire trend toward a separate "multiracial" racial 
census category echoes this "new" racial structure and assumes a 
number of false premises-that there is a "pure" African-American or 
Latino race that is "unmixed" by other races, and that individuals are 
free to assign themselves a racial designation unaffected by how they 
are perceived in larger society.98 
Many children of mixed race couples are "raced" as the darker 
parent.99 The political effect of such a new category is to create an 
illusion that racism is not part of a highly sophisticated system of dom-
inance and subordination, but simply a matter of individualized self-
naming. This further fractionalizes and dilutes the coming majority of 
96. JAMES W. LoEWEN, THE MISSISSIPPI CHINESE: BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE 2 (2d ed. 
1988). 
97. Id. 
98. See Jacinta Ma, Census 2000: Census 2000 Issues Heat Up, NAPALC REv., Spring 1997, 
at 3 (reporting on H.R. 830 requiring federal agencies to provide opportunity for respondents to 
specify "multiethnic" or "multiracial"); see also Steven A. Holmes, Panel Balks at Multiracial 
Census Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A12 (reporting that while seven states have a 
multiracial category and nine other states are considering the issue, a federal task force will 
recommend not to include a multiracial category on federal forms such as the Census Bureau 
forms, but will recommend that an individual of mixed racial parentage may self-identify and 
check off several races simultaneously on federal demographic forms). President Clinton has 
directed his "advisory panel" on race to focus on multiracialism rather than black/white rela-
tions. See James Bennet, Clinton in 2 Speeches, Urges Racial Healing," N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
1997, at A20. However, the critique of the traditional black/white paradigm of race relations has 
been used by some viewpoints to divert attention away from the operation of white supremacy. 
See Iijima, supra note 92. 
99. Indeed, the young golf sensation TIger Woods is usually referred to as being African-
American irrespective of the fact that his mother is Thai. See, e.g., Richard E. Lapchick, Lessons 
o/Tiger Woods- Will Not Be Easy Ones, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, § 8, at 8 (comparing Wood's 
victory in the Masters to Jackie Robinson's breaking of the professional sports color barrier). 
However, to the extent that there is any acknowledgement of his mixed heritage at all it is still 
bounded by racial stereotypes. In his essay, Lapchick reports that radio call-in talk shows or 
newspaper articles have attributed Woods's intelligence, family orientation, and his sense of 
racial perspective in his acknowledgement of the sacrifices and contributions of pioneering Afri-
can-American golfers solely to his being half Asian! See id. 
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has taken these fears and codified them in its racial jurisprudence by 
treating whites as a potentially victimized group to be protected.I07 
White fears of declining power are illustrated by the recent voter 
initiatives in California curtailing benefits to immigrants and eliminat-
ing affirmative action. lOS In Texas, where people of color are rapidly 
gaining numerical superiority, the elimination of racial preferences at 
the University of Texas Law School is a graphic indication of a desire 
to return to racial segregation, albeit in a more sophisticated way than 
during the Jim Crow era.I09 Given that the explicit forms of Jim Crow 
107. See Alexandra Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of 
lnterminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1995). Natapoff explores Justice 
O'Connor's plurality opinion in City of Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), to 
show how it casts the factual circumstances simply as multiple racial groups competing as equals 
for power and wealth, recasting the notion of "minority status" as a "temporary numerically 
inferior presence in a given locale, rather than a group subject to historic discrimination and in 
need of systemic remedy." ld. at 1075. Natapoff also points out that the Powell Bakke opinion 
recasts "minority" from an historical and political notion of a disadvantaged group to an ahistor-
ical numeric phenomenon. See id. at 1071. 
108. In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997), a Ninth Circuit panel held that the California Civil Rights Initiative 
("Proposition 209"), banning the use of race, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin in public 
employment, education or contracting, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See id. Using the familiar "colorblind" rationale, the court held that when "a 
state prohibits all its instruments from discriminating against or granting preferential treatment 
to anyone on the basis of race or gender, it has promulgated a law that addresses in neutral-
fashion race-related and gender-related matters." ld. at 707. For a description of an effect of 
anti-affirmative action measures in California see infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
Proposition 187 was a 1994 California ballot initiative that denied state benefits and services 
to undocumented immigrants. Enforcement of major provisions was enjoined in League of 
United Latin Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Ca. 1995) (holding that sections of the 
initiative attempted to regulate immigration and were preempted by federal law). 
109. After the FIfth Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional its admissions policy 
which considered the race of an applicant, only three African Americans will be in the 1997 first 
year class at the University of Texas Law School of 500. See Peter Applebome, Minority Law 
School Enrollment Plunges in California and Texas, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at AI. 
At the University of California at Berkeley after the Board of Regents ban on affirmative 
action in 1995, there is only one African American entering student in the fall 1997 entering class 
of 270. See id. At UCLA Law School the projected entering number of African Americans is 
10, a decline of almost 50% from the year before. See id. Indeed, at Berkeley, one Black stu-
dent is a decline from 20 the previous year; at Texas the decline is from 21 to three. See id. 
There is also a significant decline in the number of Latino entering students at both the law 
schools at Berkeley and the University of Texas. See id. These figures underscore the prediction 
that the abandonment of race as a factor in law school admission would drastically affect the 
diversity of law schools, barring potential students of color who would both graduate and suc-
cessfully pass the bar. See Linda F. Wrightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admis-
sion Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 52 (1997). 
In a related matter, anti-Asian violence increased 80% from 1994 to 1995 in Southern Cali-
fornia and 10% in Northern California, a state where the initiatives against immigration have 
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segregation are not politically viable (at least not yet), the imperative 
of continued racial subordination by an increasingly isolated white 
minority will simultaneously require sophisticated mechanisms of 
racial stratification and control, and the maintenance of stereotypes to 
monitor and suppress dissatisfaction by those subordinated. This 
increased sophistication is played out on both an ideological and polit-
icallevel. 
Apartheid looked "to a state based upon democratic-aristocratic 
concepts, that is, of democratic processes within the fold of the white 
race.,,110 Thus, if a traditional caste system is marked by vertical seg-
regation, apartheid was marked by both vertical and horizontal (terri-
torial) segregation.ll1 Apartheid's over-all scheme was to "reduce the 
area of intercourse between the non-European races as well as 
between them and the white race."1l2 This strict segregation between 
populations was to provide conditions for races to develop "indepen-
dently" of each other.u3 
had success. See NATIONAL AsIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM, AUDIT OF VIO-
LENCE AGAINST AsIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTOLERANCE IN 
AMERICA 11 (1995). Hate crimes against Asian Americans in the United States rose 17% in 
1996. See Aurelio Rojas, Hate Crimes on Rise Against Asian Americans, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 9, 
1997, at A2. 
110. Dvorin, supra note 101, at 58. 
111. See id. at 59. 
112. fd. at 94. There were some attempts to classify based upon appearance: European by 
appearance and social circle, African by appearance and social circle, etc. See Wilmot G. James, 
Group Areas and the Nature of Apartheid 26 (American Bar Foundation Working Paper Series 
#9214) (1992). Spouses of mixed couples were classified "downward" and only those coloured 
who "passed" and had married whites were classified "upward" as white. See id. 
113. See Dvorin, supra note 101, at 151. This is not to suggest that other status categories 
such as class or gender are not relevant and in some cases determine the ordering of hierarchy 
either in apartheid South Africa or the United States. However, in apartheid South Africa as 
well as in the contemporary United States "[r]ace, under certain conditions may become the 
content of class struggle ... [since] [r]ace [may be] the modality ... in which class is lived, the 
medium through which class relations are experienced, and the form in which it is appropriated 
.... " HAROLD WOLPE, RACE, CLASS & THE APARTHEID STATE 52 (1988) (quoting Stuart Hall). 
Wolpe describes and critiques various political theories in apartheid South Africa: "race 
reductionist theories" which assume "within a racial group there is a uniform, common and 
equal investment in the racial ordering of the social system," id. at 12; "economic reductionist 
theories" which define interests solely in terms of class interests which in turn are entirely 
defined by the economic relations of production and in which race is merely an external instru-
ment for the reproduction of class interests, id. at 14-15; and "colonialism of a special type" or 
"internal colonialism" which divides society into a category of white subjects and a subordinate 
category of black subjects and in which there are internal class divisions within each category but 
the "overriding factor is the racial division," id. at 30. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to articulate comprehensively the consequences of the 
interstices of different relationships. However, it is enough to recognize the importance of 
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color into more disparate constituencies in which there are only 
"minorities"-whites then becoming the largest one.lOO 
This "informal" tiering, of course, is highly reminiscent of the rig-
idly tiered structure of the now dismantled South African 
apartheid.lol Although to many of my colleagues of color the news 
may be old, and despite the outcry that the proposition might occasion 
by some of my other colleagues, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
as South Africa has begun the arduous struggle to dismantle the 
effects of its apartheid history, America has embarked upon the crea-
tion of a more subtle, sophisticated brand of it for the new millen-
nium. Moreover, Asian Americans are a linchpin of it. 
Of course, yielding to the temptation to "soundbite" America's 
racial climate as apartheid comes with attendant risks. As former 
Judge Leon Higginbotham warned about the inherent difficulties in 
comparing the approach to race in two different countries: "[T]here is 
a high risk of superficiality in comparing two separate countries dur-
ing different eras. Indeed, to compare race issues in the United States 
and South Africa over the course of two hundred years is to enter a 
potential quagmire that few scholars have been willing to explore."lo2 
There is no attempt here to match exactly the two nations' 
approaches to racial hierarchy. Instead, simple analogies will illus-
trate the points. However, it should be emphasized that the single 
greatest difference between the two countries from Higginbotham's 
perspective may not be as true in the near future as it is now: 
100. Neil Gotanda discusses how the model minority image "carries an implied racial con-
text of racial stratification and that there are distinct ideological messages implicit within the 
model minority image and racial stratification." Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the 
"Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087, 1088 (Hyung-
Chan Kim ed., 1992), at 1088. The ideological message is articulated as follows: 
Under the model of racial stratification ... the economic disparities between Black and 
White ... do not appear to be a genuine social problem. The presence of more success-
ful Asian Americans and Latinos, located between Whites and African Americans, 
proves that the social and economic barriers can be overcome and are not rooted in 
"race." Thus racial stratification serves to justify and legitimate existing racial 
disparities. 
[d. at 109l. 
101. See, e.g., EUGENE P. DVORIN, RACIAL SEPARATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (1952). 
102. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similarities 
and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 489 (1990) [hereinafter Racism in Courts]. See also A. 
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The 
DiffiCUlt Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 763, 775 (1990) [hereinafter De Jure 
Housing Segregation] ("Although there are similarities in the racial histories of the United States 
and South Africa, they must be considered in light of the substantial differences .... [among 
them] the two countries' populations, demographics, economics, religions, cultures, and 
governments."). 
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Perhaps the single most significant difference is the fact that from 
the inception of the United States, whites have constituted a numer-
ical majority and have acquired a predominance of economic and 
political power .... [such that the] accommodation of the legitimate 
demands of blacks would not result in a substantial diminution of 
their power.103 
In fact, after the year 2050, Blacks, Asians, Latinos, and Native 
Americans will attain a majority population.lo4 Whites in America 
are already visualizing themselves as a racial minority. lOS They fear 
their status is eroding and that people of color are usurping their 
traditional positions of power and privilege.106 The Supreme Court 
103. Higginbotham, De Jure Housing Segregation, supra note 102, at 775. Conversely, given 
the minority of South African whites, accommodating the demands of black South Africans 
would "result in the e1imination of the white monopoly on political and economic power." Hig-
ginbotham, De Jure Housing Segregation, supra note 102, at 776. 
104. See, e.g., Brad Edmondson, The Minority Majority in 2001, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 
1996, at 16; Ramon G. McLeod, Census Shows a Turning Point-Hispanics Increasing the Fastest, 
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 27, 1996, at A14 (citing a 1996 United States Census Bureau report that 
estimating that at some point in the 21st century the non-Hispanic white population will be a 
minority). 
105. While the actual percentage of white population in the United States is 74%, whites 
believe the percentage is under 49.9%. While the actual figure for blacks is about 12%, the 
white estimation was about 24%. See Priscilla Labovitz, Immigration-Just the Facts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at A15. 
106. See Richard Morin, A Distorted Image of Minorities; Poll Suggests That What Whites 
Think They See May Affect Beliefs, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at AI. A telephone poll, 
conducted by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, inter-
viewed 1,970 randomly selected Americans, including 802 whites, 474 blacks, 352 Asians and 252 
Latinos. The survey found that 58% of whites felt that blacks had jobs of equal quality or better 
than those held by whites (46% of whites felt that blacks had jobs of equal quality to those of 
whites, 6% said blacks had jobs that were "a little better" than whites and 6% stated that blacks 
held jobs that were "a lot better"). 
Moreover, fears that immigration is producing economic hardship for the United States are 
unfounded. Immigration adds approximately $10 billion to the American economy due to an 
increased labor supply and decreased prices. See Robert Pear, Academy's Report Says Immigra-
tion Benefits the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, at AI. Any negative effects such as depressed 
wages or increased competition for low wage jobs were "relatively small." Id. Moreover, 
"immigration does not have a decisive influence on the economic opportunities of blacks. Id. at 
A24. While in such states as New Jersey and California immigration may account for some 
increased taxes, this is offset by immigrants helping to "pay the public costs of the aging baby 
boom generation." Id. Thus, "the vast majority of Americans are enjoying a healthier econ-
omy" as a result of immigration. Id. at AI. In fact, the assumption of a large influx of undocu-
mented immigrants from Mexico has been dramatically overblown. See Sam Dillon, U.S.-
Mexico Study Sees Exaggeration of Migration Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at Al ("The first 
formal migration study by the American and Mexican governments has concluded that the 
number of undocumented Mexican workers who have settled in the United States in this decade 
is far lower than some politicians have suggested, only about 105,000 a year"). 
[Vol. 7:1 1998] POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION 33 
Mixed race Coloureds (descended predominantly from Euro-
pean-slave unions) traditionally kept themselves apart from the 
Native population, and prior to the Nationalist victory in 1948 those 
who lived in Cape Province actually had certain advantages over 
native Africans such as no residential segregation, the ability to own 
property, the right to vote subject to certain conditions, and the right 
to hold elective local offices, although they suffered similar restric-
tions to Black Africans in other provinces.114 Although Coloureds 
were usually discriminated against in employment and social practice 
in the vast majority of South Africa, they were seen traditionally as an 
"appendix of the European population" and an "intermediate nation" 
whose interests were more "closely allied" to those of Europeans than 
other sections of the population.115 After the Nationalist victory in 
1948, even more restrictions were imposed on the Coloureds, even in 
Cape Province, and their interests became no longer linked to those of 
the Europeans.n6 
The view toward South African Asians under apartheid (Indians, 
Malays, Chinese) was that no matter what their status, they were not 
considered an "indigenous portion of South Africa," and the long 
range goal was to reduce the population.n7 Thus, there was an 
attempt to lower the status of the Asian population so as to "offer no 
threat to white supremacy" in the economy of the South African 
nation.ns The Nationalists allowed the Indian population to own land 
assessing the relative position of one's group with respect to another in any given political con-
text. See Yamamoto, supra note 92, at 891 (acknowledging the "capacity of racial groups, amid 
changing racial demographics and socio-economic structures, to be simultaneously oppressed 
and oppressive, liberating and subordinating"). 
114. See Dvorin, supra note 101, at 61-63. 
115. ld. at 63-64. 
116. See id. at 64. It is worth noting that before 1948, there was some view to allow limited 
economic and political participation for Coloureds, and had that been successfully done "the 
racial balance would have been significantly altered." GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE 
SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 272 (1981). 
It was the alienation of Coloureds and Asians through the harshness of apartheid, and thus the 
unity among the nonwhite groups in opposition to apartheid, that forced whites to extend civil 
rights to all nonwhites. See id. at 273. Indeed, it has been speculated that if a more sophisticated 
approach to racial hegemony had been taken by South African whites, South Africa as a 
"racially diverse nation of essentially European culture (with the whites securely entrenched as a 
major population group) would have been in a strong position to survive indefinitely .... " ld. 
117. See Dvorin, supra note 101, at 157-58. 
118. ld. at 162. 
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putting them on a higher economic level than Africans, but the Indi-
ans had no franchise of any form, giving them an inferior political 
status.119 
This distinction had the desired divisive political consequences. 
On the one hand, the Asian population could choose between regard-
ing themselves apart from the other non-European segments and thus 
demand equality for themselves alone or could have regarded their 
issue as involving all non-Europeans.12° On the other hand, Indians 
were resented due to exploitation by Indian traders in Native areas in 
terms of high prices and inferior goodS.121 In 1949, rioting Africans in 
Durban targeted Indian property and as many as 142 Indians were 
killed.122 Thus, the racial tiering under apartheid simultaneously 
served to codify the white minority's supremacy as well as to divide 
opposition by people of color to it.l23 
119. See id. at 161. 
120. See id. at 166. 
121. See id. at 169. 
122. See id. at 168. A similar phenomenon happened in the Mississippi Delta after the assas-
sination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968. Chinese stores in the Delta's black communities 
were hard hit. See Loewen, supra note 89, at 174-75. The author notes that Chinese stores were 
"safer" than white.stores, since Chinese had less access to police protection. See id. at 176. 
Moreover, the targeting of Chinese merchants had another motivation: 
Id. 
Fmally, it may be that the Chinese as a group are now singled out because Negroes are 
particularly enraged by the irony of their gain in status. White grocers were always 
white. Chinese, however, were once in approximately the same position as blacks, were 
once brothers in oppression ...• Blacks may feel a sense of betrayal in the action of the 
Chinese. 
This sentiment is echoed again thirty years later in analyses of the violent discourse between 
the African-American and Korean-American communities: 
The African American community continues to struggle against a status quo legal nar-
rative-white supremacy. The struggle at present is articulated as a violent discourse, 
and given the recent presence of Koreans in minority markets, African American vio-
lence inevitably envelops Koreans. However, Koreans per se are not the primary tar-
get. Rather, African Americans attack Koreans as symbols of "entrepreneurship." ... 
African Americans have suffered a long history of racial injustice and economic ine-
quality. As a consequence African Americans have reacted negatively to Koreans not 
only because Koreans have attained greater economic power, but because they present 
symbols of opportunities for economic success not available to African Americans. 
Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstmcting Violent Discourse 
Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15, 41-42 (1993). See also Lisa C. 
Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Con-
flict: How We Constmcted "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581 (1993). 
123. See Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 
407 (1995). Ellmann makes the observation that although Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians were 
all victimized by apartheid, Coloureds and Asians were "less acutely victimized," and when it 
came time to shape a new order, Coloured and Asians gave substantial support to the National 
Party (formerly the "all-white champion of apartheid"), and the majority of Africans gave their 
support to the African National Congress. Id. at 432-33. It is interesting to note that in a recent 
New York Times article, the author's questions about racism "split along racial and ethnic lines 
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In the present day United States, as racial tiering becomes more 
of a political necessity for white minority hegemony, there is a not-so-
subtle ideological campaign developing that focuses on two prominent 
themes: (1) the national "character" is inextricably bound with certain 
racial and cultural normative assumptions; and (2) since racial identity 
is essentially and solely an individual's choice, racism is cognizable 
only if it is explicitly practiced upon individuals. However, the reality 
is, as one commentator has expressed it: 
Regardless of how truly one is able to express one's personal iden-
tity, structural racism in U.S. society will persist in forcing people 
into one of the five boxes of the racial/ethnic pentagon [Black, 
White, Asian, Native American, Hispanic] for the foreseeable 
future. 
* * * * 
The fact that individual identity is vitally important does not pre-
clude the fact that societal identity of groups is also important. 
Because the two are not necessarily the same, it logically follows 
that they do not necessarily have to agree. The way in which a per-
son defines himself or herself is distinct from the way which society 
defines him or her, although both have important repercussions and 
ramifications. We gain nothing but confusion by trying to blend the 
two concepts or obfuscate their distinctness.124 
Indeed, the fact remains "[w]hites have the option of ethnic iden-
tity, whereas people of color do not."l25 Similarly, with regard to the 
former theme, the operating normative principle has become one in 
which racism has "disappeared except as . . . 'imagined' by its 
subordinated subjects who [continue] to 'suffer' in an unbelievable 
world-a color blind world of white innocence.,,126 Indeed, as 
opposed to the cumbersome mechanisms of apartheid and Jim Crow, 
[where] .... African Americans tended to see the problem in much starker terms than did 
whites, Asian-Americans and Hispanic respondents .... " Steven A. Holmes, Many Uncertainties 
About President's Racial Effort, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at A16. 
124. Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect Categories 
Yield Correct Information? 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 83, 97 (1997). 
125. Id. at 91. 
126. Calmore, supra note 91, at 28 (quoting John O. Calmore, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1764, 1776 (1993». 
Indeed, the colorblind myth confuses the ideal of an end to racial hierarchy with what 
already exists. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning To 
Think And Talk About Race Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,6 (1995). In fact, "denial is a 
pervasive symptom of contemporary American racism." Id. at 8. Of course, the denial of reality 
merely perpetuates the condition of racial subordination. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our 
Constitution Is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1,6 (1991) ("Nonrecognition [ofrace] fosters the 
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"[t]oday's racism is state-of-the-art."127 It plays upon the old fears, 
yet simultaneously legitimatizes and masks old white supremacist poli-
tics by reducing race to mere ethnicity ("in the end we're all hyphen-
ated Americans"), and by dressing up old concepts of white 
supremacy in categories of individualized opportunity, meritocracy, 
and universalism by appealing to "traditional values" and "individual 
responsibility. "128 
Indeed, "traditional values" are given a decidedly racial spin: 
"As late as 1950, somewhere up to nine out of ten Americans looked 
like me. That is, they were of European stock. And in those days, 
they had another name for this thing dismissed so contemptuously as 
'the racial hegemony of white Americans.' They called it 
'America. '''129 
This open fear of the loss of racial hegemony is by no means a 
radical fringe notion. It is simply the more decayed underbelly of col-
orblind egalitarian propaganda-the "Willie Horton" appeal to white 
systematic denial of racial subordination and the psychological repression of an individual's rec-
ognition of that subordination, thereby allowing such subordination to continue.") (footnote 
omitted». 
127. Calmore, supra note 91, at 28. 
128. ld. at 52-53. 
129. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER 59 (1995). Brimelow understands that race has always been defining in American 
politics. See id. at xvii ("[T]he racial and ethnic balance of America is being radically altered 
through public policy. This can only have the most profound effects. Is this what Americans 
want?"). He has no illusions that this nation is or should be colorblind. See id. at 10 ("[M]any 
modem American intellectuals [are] just unable to handle a plain historical fact: that the Ameri-
can nation has always had a specific ethnic core. And that core has been white."). Thus, his 
fears are expressly about losing racial hegemony. See id. at 56 ("For the first time, virtually all 
immigrants are racially distinct "visible minorities." They come not from Europe. . . . And, as 
we have seen, they are coming in such numbers that their impact on America is enormouS-
inevitably within the foreseeable future, they \vill transform it"). And what is most telling is the 
appeal to his own sense of "family values"-the continuing legacy of white privilege for his 
children: 
My son, Alexander, is a white male with blue eyes and blond hair. He has never dis-
criminated against anyone in his little life .... But now public policy discriminates 
against him. The sheer size of the so-called "protected classes" that are now politically 
favored, such as Hispanics, will be a matter of vital importance as long as he lives. And 
their size is basically determined by immigration. 
ld. at 11. 
Brimelow recounts how he read a newspaper story in which a Chinese-American college 
student, when asked what grade she would give America, replied that she "would give it an 
incomplete." He continues: "Really. Well, my twin brother and I did have to grade America ... 
in the su=er of 1967. We gave it an A+. And we still give it an A+ •.. what's left of it. And-
if only for my son Alexander's sake-I'd like it to stay that way." ld. at 221. 
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supremacy.130 Its ability to foster fears of an irresistible tidal wave of 
color inundating the country is evident by noting that in the first 
months alone of 1997, four bills and one resolution were submitted to 
the United States Congress to declare English as the nation's "official 
language. "131 
Moreover, the previously "neutral" themes of individual mer-
itocracy have become less racially opaque.132 The far right has "legiti-
mate[ d] its revived racial politics in a way that did not simply reassert 
white identity as inherent white supremacy in order to reestablish 
America as a white country" but has instead "hijacked" the notion of 
colorblindness for its own racial project and set the stage for the 
development of new right racial agendas playing on the same fears.133 
130. See Calmore, supra note 91, at 51. Calmore astutely notes that Ronald Reagan 
"silently incorporated aspects of the far right's racial project in order to broaden his support 
base. He recognized that the far right's appeal extended to people who would normally disasso-
ciate themselves from extremism." [d. 
131. On January 7, 1997, the "English Language Empowerment Act" was introduced to 
declare English as the official language of the United States government ( section 161) and 
requiring that all written communication of official government business be in English (section 
163(a». H.R. 123, 105th Congo §§ 161, 163(a) (1997). 
On February 4,1997, House Resolution 37 was introduced in the House of Representatives 
proposing a Constitutional Amendment establishing English as the official language of the 
United States to be "used for all public acts .... of the Government of the Unites States and the 
governments of the several States." H.R.J. Res. 37, 105th Congo § 1 (1997). 
On February 5,1997, House Bill 622, the "Declaration of Official Language Act of 1997," 
was introduced in the House which was essentially the same as House Bill 123, but also repealing 
bilingual voting requirements. H.R. 622, 105th Congo (1997). 
On February 13, 1997, Senate Bill 323, the "Language of Government Act of 1997," was 
introduced in the Senate which mandated English but allowed "terms of art" such as "E Pluribus 
Unum" to grace government documents. S. 323, 105th Congo § 165(2)(F) (1997). 
On March 11, 1997, House Bill 1005, the "National Language Act," was introduced in the 
House which looked to repeal not only bilingual voting requirement (section 4), but looked to 
terminate bilingual education programs as well (section 3). H.R. 1005, 105th Congo §§ 3, 4 
(1997). 
In addition, at least eighteen states have adopted some variation of an "official English" 
law. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 927 n.ll (9th Cir. 1995) (listing 
Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and VIrginia). 
132. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: lNrELLIGENCE 
AND CLASS STRUCWRE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). 
133. Calmore, supra note 91, at 50 n.145, 51-52. 
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In the infamous book The Bell Curve, after attempting to order 
racial intelligence, the authors intone that since inequality of intelli-
gence is a reality, "[iJt is time for America once again to try living with 
inequality, as life is lived .... "134 
It is not entirely coincidental that as some call for "independent 
development within neighborhoods," racial segregation in residential 
communities still is rampant across the country, particularly in urban 
areas.13S Indeed, given the recent anti-immigrant and anti-affirmative 
134. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 132, at 551. In terms chillingly reminiscent of 
classic apartheid political theory, they expressly assert the notion that a "natural aristocracy" 
governing those less equally intellectually endowed is a principle of the Founders. ld. at 530-31. 
What is remarkable to me about this statement is not that as slaveholders many of the Founding 
Fathers must have believed in a natural order of human hierarchy, but rather the baldness of its 
assertion. Herrnstein and Murray end with a thinly veiled paean to the time·honored apartheid 
tradition of separate parallel development of the races: 
Cognitive partitioning will continue. It cannot be stopped, because the forces driving it 
cannot be stopped. But America can choose to preserve a society in which every citizen 
has access to the central satisfactions of life. Its people can, through an intenveaving of 
choice and responsibility, create valued places for themselves in their worlds. They can 
live in communities-urban or rural-where being a good parent, a good neighbor, and 
a good friend will give their lives purpose and meaning. They can weave the most 
crucial safety nets together, so that their mistakes and misfortunes are mitigated and 
withstood with a little help from their friends. 
ld. at 551. Indeed, their political solution is a return to the idea of localized government in which 
everybody, it is assumed, knows their "place": 
A wide range of social [unctions should be restored to the neighborhood when possible 
and otherwise to the municipality. The reason for doing so, in the context of this book, 
is not to save money, not even because such services will be provided more humanely 
and efficiently by neighborhoods (though we believe that generally to be the case), but 
because this is one of the best ways to multiply the valued places that people can fill. 
ld. at 540. 
135. See Denton, supra note 118, at 85 (noting that current levels of segregation for African· 
Americans in large cities remain near their all·time high and show few signs of decreasing (citing 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 222 (1993). 
Denton and Massey reach three conclusions: (1) residential segregation continues unabated 
in the largest metropolitan black communities and that this spatial isolation cannot be attributed 
to class; (2) whites accept open housing only in principle but not in practice; (3) discrimination in 
housing against blacks is widespread and at high levels in urban housing markets. See MASSEY & 
DENTON, supra, at 109. They find that blacks are more likely to be tolerated by whites as neigh· 
bors only when they constitute a small percentage of the population. As such, "where racial 
composition is such that open housing can be implemented without threatening white prefer· 
ences for limited contact with blacks, desegregation should occur; but in areas where relatively 
large numbers of blacks imply a high degree of black·white mixing under an open market, racial 
segregation will be maintained." ld. at 111. The significance of race was striking when applied 
to Caribbean Hispanics. Denton and Massey found that average levels of segregation among 
Hispanics were dictated by whether they were white, mixed·race, or black in appearance. See id. 
at 112-114. The authors conclude that "[w]hen it comes to housing and residential patterns, 
therefore, race is the dominant organizing principle. No matter what their ethnic origin, eco· 
nomic status, social background, or personal characteristics, African Americans continue to be 
denied full access to U.S. housing markets." ld. at 114. 
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action climate of white America in the 1990s, the ugly ideology of 
those like Herrnstein, Murray, and Brimelow cannot be written off as 
simply that of marginal right wing fanatics. Moreover, what is so 
sophisticated about the approach is its lack of readily observable 
structure. The racial and gender ceiling is glass, the bars are tantaliz-
ingly see-through, and the enforcement of status is through the vague 
uncertainties of "colorblind" judicial opinion and "neutral principle" 
rather than through the crude truncheon of codes and statutes. Yet, 
the gap between white and color and between rich and poor continues 
to accelerate apace.136 
Perhaps the most tragic consequence of acquiescence to racial 
injustice is its effect on those who acquiesce. The failure to resist the 
imposition of inferior status gradually becomes an acceptance of the 
logic of it. In April, 1942, on behalf of the JACL, Masaoka sent a 
letter to Milton Eisenhower, the director of the War Relocation 
Authority, outlining his suggestions for WRA policy. Among these 
suggestions were some related to adjustment after the war. Masaoka 
wrote "We do not relish the thought of 'Little Tokyos' springing up in 
these resettlement projects, for by doing so we are only perpetuating 
the very mannerisms and thoughts which mark us apart, aside from 
physical characteristics. We hope for a one hundred percent Ameri-
can community."137 
Fairfax County, Virginia, one of the wealthiest co=unities in the nation (with $70,000 
annual household income which is twice the national median), recently cut welfare benefits, 
blocked ell.llansion of subsidized housing, and made it more difficult for unemployed to get into 
public housing in the county. These actions most affect recent immigrants from Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa. See Eric Lipton, Discouraging the Poor in Fairfax; County Officials Cut Bene-
fits as Disincentive, WASH. POST, June 29,1997, at Al (reporting county officials cutting benefits 
as a disincentive to potential low income residents). 
136. See Rich Thomas, A Rising Tide Lifts the Yachts, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 62D. The 
article reports that the wealth of 1 % of U.S. households climbed from 20% of the aggregate of 
the country's private assets in the mid-1970s to 35.7% in 1989. In 1969, the top 20% of Ameri-
can households received 7.5 times the income of the bottom 20%, but by 1992, it was 11 times 
the income. See also Barbara Vobejda, Black-White Income Gap Widens over 1ivo Decades, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A14 (stating that the median income among black families was 
54% of that for white families in 1992, but that it was 61 % in 1969). 
137. Lim, supra note 68, at 8. Indeed, of Masaoka's "colorblind" assumptions of a postwar 
American reality, Weglyn writes: 
Perhaps nothing had influenced Nisei so profoundly as wartime accusations of their 
"unassimilability," innuendos that it was their clannishness and propensity to cluster 
which had helped to bring on the calamity .... The goal of jettisoning their Japanese-
ness and assimilating into the larger society became a near obsession for them in the 
early postwar years. Many forced themselves into resettling in unknown parts of the 
country, cutting themselves adrift from the tight-knit society in which they and their 
parents had once found security. 
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Thus, the carrot of model minority status for Asian Pacific Amer-
icans will not only be useful as a sword against other people of color. 
It will also serve as a dagger in the heart of the self-esteem of all 
Asians who accept its "benefits" because the weapon may only be 
wielded in the defense of the racial status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a dangerous Orwellian era of racial backlash, when viru-
lent right-wing ideology is dressed up and passed off as "conservative" 
politics. It is a time when attempts to roll back the clock to Jim Crow 
are named "civil rights initiatives." It is a period in which conserva-
tive judicial activism in a naked attempt to ossify the society's racial 
and economic stratification is done in the name of "strict judicial con-
struction." We live in a time when there is a highly charged battle cry 
against "political correctness." However it is shouted by those who 
would use the code words of the right-"less government," "local 
autonomy," "colorblindness," "traditional values," "personal respon-
sibility," "neutral principles," "traditional American culture"-as 
markers of acceptable political and personal morality. 
Asian Pacific Americans are at a crossroads in terms of where 
they will stand in the coming era of race relations-either to be used 
to solidify the control of white supremacy or to be a force standing 
against it. In the justice that was rendered by national redress for 
incarceration, also lies the danger that its price will be ideological 
cooptation. By giving tribute to those who chose to acquiesce to the 
injustice and neglecting those who protested it, Congress has indicated 
the price of its beneficence. But, the lesson of redress must be that 
only through the resistance to injustice at the moment it occurs, will a 
tragedy like internment be avoided in the future. Indeed, the largest 
tragedy will be if we continue to slouch toward a society in which 
power and wealth accumulate in increasingly smaller concentration. 
In the lacuna of time before the new millennium, it is incumbent upon 
all Asian Pacific Americans, particularly Japanese-Americans-
indeed, all people of good will-to continue to resist attempts to 
impose white minority rule. 
It is worth reminding ourselves constantly that while America 
may have been built by all its people, it still does not yet belong to all 
of us. 
WEGLYN, supra note 23, at 274. See also HOHRI, supra note 16, at 137 ("There are a great many 
Japanese-Americans who tried to take the magic pill to dissolve the 'Jap-ness.'''). 
